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This document collects together the reports and analyses of the objective data from FBE 
F, FBE G and FBE H. The objective data are primarily quantitative and, whenever 
possible, were collected electronically for post experiment analysis. A primary objective 
of the objective data analysis is the construction of engagement time lines that detail the 
intervals required for each discrete step in the engagement process from initial target 
sensing until BDA is reported. To realize this objective requires that each event in the 
engagement process is logged, time tagged and the associated relevant engagement 
parameters recorded. 
This sequence of experiments shows the increasing scope of objective data collection. In 
FBE F, the analyzed data were limited to the displays captured in LAWS, the central 
component of the Digital Fires Network (DFN). LAWS has remained the primary source 
of objective data through all the experiments. Unfortunately, there are many data 
elements that never appear or are frequently missing from the LAWS timelines. The 
deficiencies in the LAWS data are described on pages 8 and 49. 
In FBE G, the LAWS data, were supplemented by event data from the JTW/PTW+ 
systems. Although JTW/PTW+ data were collected for all targets nominated for 
mensuration, these data were manually collected and suffer from the inaccuracy inherent 
in this process. Data were also collected from RMS. However, the received RMS data 
were summary statistics (e.g. mean and median times for route creation), not event data 
for each individual engagement. 
In FBE G, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) communications were logged and time tagged. 
Experiment participants used approximately 10 IRC channels as a primary collaborative 
tool. Strictly speaking, the IRC data are not objective, but they are an important source 
of qualitative data. In FBEs, qualitative data collected include: observations made during 
the course of the experiment by observers located at critical nodes in the digital fires and 
command and control networks, notes and reports made by participants, interviews with 
participants conducted post-trial and IRC. The objective event data collected at the DFN 
component systems allow the quantitative characterization of the complete engagement 
process. The comprehensive analysis of FBEs requires both the qualitative and 
quantitative data - the quantitative data to accurately define what happened, the 
qualitative data to provide the context for the events and the why. 
In FBE H, the objective data collection moved closer to the ideal of a completely 
characterized engagement timeline. In this experiment, complete event data were 
collected for each W M  generated TLAM/TTLAM route and the GISRC workstations 
captured acquisition and nomination event data for many targets. 
Even though the number of systems from which data are being collected has expanded 
through the sequence of experiments, there are still systems from which data have not 
been obtained and for those systems which have provided data, incomplete data 
collection is unfortunately the norm. Page 76 summarizes, for FBE H, the specific event 
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data that were sought, what were obtained and why certain data were not successfully 
collected. In addition to missing system event data, the analysis of FBE objective data 
has been compromised by the lack of time synchronization among the component DFN 
systems. 
ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVE DATA FBE F 
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Time Critical Targets (TCT) in FBE-F 
This report presents data relating to TCTs in FBE-F based on an analysis of the LAWS 
data collected from the LAWS server on the JFK. The primary assumption underlying 
this analysis is that all of the targets presented in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires 
list were TCTs. GISRS-M, which nominated about one third of the targets in the list, 
confirms that all their nominations were TCTs. The principal broad conclusions drawn 
from the analysis are listed below. 
1. About half the TCT nominations were engaged. 
2. Of the targets engaged, about one third were engaged with MLRS. 
3. Of the targets not engaged, about half may not have been engaged as result of 
inadequate time, data or resources. 
4. For those targets with sufficient timeline data on which to base a conclusion, almost 
no targets were engaged within the specified target dwell time. 
5.  There does not appear to be much relation between the experimentally observed 
sensor to engagement threads and the 16 TCT threads defined in the Fleet Battle 
Experiment Foxtrot Fires and Precision Engagement Roadmap. 
6. The LAWS data contain many voids. 
Each of these points is discussed in more detail below. 
TCTs Engaged. 
The LAWS Fires mission list contained 218 targets. Of these, 14 targets (nominated by 
C5F LAWS and JPJ LAWS) were deleted because the target description contained the 
word “test”. In addition, 28 targets received at LAWS prior to December 4 (all 
nominated by PTW+) were deleted, leaving a sample of 176 targets. A target was 
defined as fired on if the Fired Status block (the FRD column) in the Mission 
Coordination: Fires table was green. A green FRD block indicates that the LAWS 
terminal received an acknowledgement from the firer that the mission was fired. Other 
targets, which do not exhibit this condition, were also considered to be fired on. In the 
sample of 176 targets there are three that have a red block labeled NAK (not 
acknowledged) in the FRD column. This means that the mission timed out without 
receiving an acknowledgement from the firer that the mission was fired. There were a 
further seven missions that are yellow in the FRD block. For unknown reasons, these 
blocks did not time out (were not turned red). Those targets that are yellow or red in the 
FRD block may have been fired on and for the purposes of this analysis they are 
presumed to have been fired on. Finally, there are six TACAIR missions listed as flown 
but only one of which shows a green FRD block. These targets are also presumed to 
have been fired on. Operating under these assumptions, 93 (53%) of the 176 TCTs 
critical targets were fired on. GISRS-M was the nominator of 72 (41%) of the 176 
targets. The data for GISRS-M nominations are more complete and considered to be 
more reliable than for the sample as a whole. Accordingly, the GISRS-M data will be 
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looked at independently of the data summed over all nominators. For GISRS-My 28 of its 
72 nominations (39%) were fired on. 
TCT firers. 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the weapon types employed against the TCTs that were 
fired on. It is emphasized that these data apply only to the engaged targets. In some 
cases, the targets that were not engaged were matched with specific firers. These 
unprosecuted matchings are not contained in Table 1. Almost half of the 93 targets 
engaged (44%), were engaged with MLRS. For the GISRS-M nominations, 32 percent 
of the engaged targets were engaged with MLRS. 
TCTs not Engaged. 
Table 2 presents those TCTs not fired on and gives a breakdown of the reasons why the 
targets were not fired on. In many cases, the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires table 
provides the reason for not firing the mission in the form of a three letter indicator 
displayed on a red or cyan Element Approval block (the TGT column). In some cases, 
the remarks or other data in the LAWS Viewing Fire MissiodTargeting Information 
window provided a plausible reason the target was not engaged. Below, these reasons 
have been divided into four classes: 
1. Not a desirable target. 
a. Dumb target (DMB). 
b. Redundant target. Target already being processed (RUT). 
c. Not High Value. Does not meet attack guidance (NHV). 
d. Target killed (KILL). 
2. Operational constraints. 
a. Effects not achieved. Weapon system not effective (ENA). 
b. Target in a no fire area (NFA). 
c. Route in conflict (RTE). 
d. Friendlies in area (FRD). 
e. Restricted fire area (RFA). 
f. High target speed (SPD). 
g. The nominator defined the Not Later Than (NLT) time as equal to the acqui 
time (N=A). 
3. Denied (DEN) 
These missions were denied for unspecified reasons. If more information were 
available they would probably fall into classes 1 or 2. 
4. Deficiency of data, time or resources. 
a. Past intelligence cutoff time or additional target intelligence required (INT). 
iti n 
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b. Require mensuration data (MEN). 
c. No known reason for not engaging (?). 
It is assumed the targets in this class 4 were not prosecuted due to a deficiency of time, 
target information or resources. As table 2 indicates, about half (57%) of the targets 
defined as not fired on fall into class 4. The corresponding figure for the GISRS-M 
nominator is 52%. 
Timelines. 
In principle, LAWS provides the data to create a timeline for each TCT mission. The 
LAWS Viewing Fire MissiodTargeting Information window has data fields for 
acquisition time and No Later Than (NLT) time. In addition, the LAWS Mission 
Timeline Report reports (ideally) and provides a time tag for a number of events in the 
process of prosecuting a TCT. These include: The time the target nomination was 
received at the LAWS server (At FSC), the time at which the fire when ready command 
was transmitted from LAWS to the fire direction system (the XMT When Ready event) 
and the receipt of a confirmation that the mission has been fired (the Fired Report event). 
Unfortunately, in many instances, one or more of these events and associated times are 
missing, or are in error, for missions that otherwise appear normal. Although the 
Mission Coordination: Fires lists contains 93 missions that have been defined as fired, 
the majority of these had insufficient data to construct a complete mission timeline. 
Figure 1 presents a histogram of the interval from acquisition time until the nomination 
was received at the LAWS server for missions that were fired. 
Figure 2 presents a histogram of the interval fkom receipt of the target nomination at the 
LAWS server until fire. To provide the fire time, the ideal would be to use the Fired 
Report time from the firing unit. However this time was lacking or in error (particularly 
for MLRS firers) in the majority of cases. Consequently, the time of the XMT When 
Ready event was often adopted as the fire time. 
Figure 3 presents the interval from acquisition to fire. The times in Figure 3 under 
represent the time for a projectile to reach the target because many use the XMT When 
Ready event time to represent the fire event time, and they do not include the projectile 
time of flight to the target. 
Figures lA, 2A and 3A are the same plots as the corresponding plots described above 
except they are limited to the targets developed by the GISRS-M nominator for which the 
data are generally more complete and reliable. Table 3 below summarizes the timeline 
data. 
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TABLE 3. TIMELINE DATA 
FIGURE ## ENTRIES MEDIAN TIME (MIN) 
Acq-LAWS Interval (Fig. 1) 46 
Acq-LAWS Interval GISRS-M (Fig. 1A) 27 
LAWS-Fire Interval (Fig. 2) 61 
LAWS-Fire Interval GISRS-M (Fig. 2A) 15 
Acq-Fire Interval (Fig. 3) 28 







Not Later Than Time (NLT) 
The success of an engagement against a TCT must be judged, in large part, on whether 
the target was engaged within the specified target dwell time. There were 23 missions 
that were fired and for which an NLT time was specified. For those 23 missions, only in 
one case was the mission fired within the target dwell time, in 18 cases it was not. In four 
cases there are insufficient data to determine if the time constraint was met. 
Time Critical Targeting Threads 
Tables 4 through 8 present the sensor to engagement threads for time critical targets for 
each target nominator. These data apply to the 93 missions previously defined as fired. 
The target type, acquiring sensor and munition fired data were collected from the LAWS 
Viewing Fire MissiodTargeting Information window. The primary points to be made 
regarding these data are: 
1. There does not appear to be much relation between these experimentally observed 
threads and the 16 TCT threads defined in the Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot Fires 
and Precision Engagement Roadmap (section 19). 
2. The LAWS data lack specificity. One sensor is defined as ELINT but which type of 
platform mounted the sensor is unidentified. Another “sensor” is Photo Interpretation 
(PI) but there is no indication what the original source of the image was. 
3. The Engagement thread data reported by the LAWS nominators (C5F, JFK, JYG and 
DOCC) was incomplete. In particular, in almost no case was the acquiring sensor 
specified. 
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4. The LAWS operator and/or nominators do not use standard terminology. For 
example, in a number of cases target type is referred to as SSM. The remarks indicate 
this target type is used to apply to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and surface to air 
missiles. 
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Data Capture Recommendations 
This analysis was entirely dependent on the data collected through LAWS. LAWS has 
the potential for providing detailed quantitative data, particularly in the development of 
time lines of the events in the process of prosecuting TCTs. However, in practice the 
data have been found to be rather incomplete. It is understood that the data collection 
potential of LAWS depends on a combination of operator training and software 
modifications to LAWS andor the simulations with which it interacts. Listed below are 




3 .  
4. 
5 .  
6. 
Some Mission Timeline reports lacked XMT When Ready events. This could occur 
even when, in the Mission Coordination: Fires table, the Fire Mission Status block 
(WRD) was yellow or green. When the WRD block is yellow or green there should 
be a transmit fire command event in the timeline. 
Some missions that were presumably fired, lacked a Fired Report event. This, at least 
in some cases, is a result of the fact the firings are simulated and often the firers are 
simulated. This problem may be addressable by having a more responsive 
simulation. 
For many MLRS missions, the Fired Report times as reported in the timelines were in 
error, being days or many hours after the XMT When Ready event. A large number 
of these erroneous Fired Reports had times within a few seconds of 7 Dec 13:48 
(local time). 
Many missions had no acquisition time reported in the Viewing Fire 
MissiodTargeting Information window. The nominatorLAWS operator must enter 
the acquisition time. 
Most missions did not have a NLT time reported in the Viewing Fire 
MissiodTargeting Information window. The nominatorLAWS operator must enter 
the NLT time. 
Many targets nominated by the CF5 LAWS nominator contained the word “test” in 
the target description. These targets were excluded from the above analysis. It is 
suspected that there are other test cases that were not so indicated. Operators need to 
ensure that all targets that represent practice events are clearly distinguished from 




It would be helpful to expand the event data reported in the Mission Timeline report 
to routinely include other event data, e.g., acquisition time, expected time to engage, 
receipt of mensuration data, and receipt of route data. 
The target priority specified in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires table bears no 
relation to the target priorities in the Attack Guidance Matrix. A uniform definition 
of priority should be established. 
In only two of the seven cases where a target was denied because it was redundant 
(RUT) was the target it was redundant with identified. The operator should always 
specify the redundant target. 
10. There are cases where TGT is not green (e.g. GS0070 = reviewed blue, GS2127 = 
denied RUT, PT0214 = red) but FRD is green. It is presumed these are cases where 
the LAWS operator chose to override the review or denial. It would seem less 
confusing if the fire override automatically changed TGT to green. 
1 1. There are cases where there is no denied or reviewed condition exhibited in the 
Mission Coordination: Fires table, but in the Viewing Fire Mission window, the 
Reason field, which displays the reason for a denial, contains a value (e.g. LE0034, 
Not High Value; JS0108, Intelligence). This appears to be an inconsistency. 
12. There are a several cases where the mission was fired but the LAWS data contain no 
information on the identity of the firer. It is understood that for MLRS missions the 
specific fire unit and munition are specified by AFATDS and it is not known to 
LAWS, but in the FBE-F Mission Coordination: Fires table many MLRS missions do 
have firer and munition data. The operator should at least specify the mission is 
MLRS. 
13. Most of the JSOTF nominated targets had acquisition times entered only as hr:min. 
Operators should specify all times in dd:hh:mm . 
14. All times should be expressed in the same reference frame. At present, the acquisition 
and NLT times are reported in the Viewing Fire MissiodTargeting Information 
window in Zulu time. The Mission Timeline report gives event times in local time. 
15. The nominators/LAWS operators need to be more specific with regard to the sensors 
acquiring a target. ELINT and PI are too generic, at least the platform type that the 
acquiring sensor is mounted on should also be identified. 
16. The nominators/LAWS operators need to develop a standard terminology for the 
LAWS data fields. In particular, target type and acquiring source. 
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TABLE 1. FBE-F TCTS FIRED ON 
#TARGETS FIRER TYPES 
NOMINATOR (#  TARGETS FIRED ON 
1 CAV2BDE 5 0 
GISRS-M 72 28 9 7 1 3 4 4 
JSWS 19 7 5 1 1 
C5F LAWS 10 7 1 4 2 
JFK LAWS 7 4 2 2 
JYG LAWS 2 2 2 
DOCC LAWS 20 20 18 2 
PTW+ 22 17 8 3 4 2 
JSOTF 19 8 2 5 1 
MLRS I TTLAM I ERGM I LASM ITACAIRI UNKNOWh 
TOTALS 176 93 41 12 10 15 7 8 
TABLE 2. FBE-F TCTS NOT FIRED ON 
#TARGETS 
NOMINATOR I #TARGETS NOT FIRED 01 
1 CAV2BDE 5 5 
GISRS-M 72 44 
'JSWS 19 12 
C5F LAWS 10 3 
JFK LAWS 7 3 
JYG LAWS 2 0 
DOCC LAWS 20 0 
PTW+ 22 5 
JSOTF 19 11 
TOTALS 176 83 
JOT DESIRABLE 
IMBI  RUT I NHV KILL 





2 3  
4 7 9 2  
TOTAL=22 
OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
ZNA NFA RTE FRD RFA SPD N=A 
1 1 2  3 2  
1 
1 
1 1  
1 1 4 1 1 3 2  
TOTAL = 13 
DMB = Dumb target 
RUT = Redundant target. Target already being processed 
NHV = Not high value. Does not meet attack guidance 
KILL. Remarks in the Targeting Information window indicate the target has been killed 
ENA = Effects not achieved. Weapon system not effective 
NFA = No fire area 
RTE = Route in conflict 
FRD = friendlies in area 









NT MEN ? 
5 





1 1 2  
15 4 28 
'OTAL = 47 
N =A.  The LAWS Targeting information window gives target acquisition times and Not Later Than times that are identical 
DEN. Target denied for no specified reason. 
SPD. Remarks in the Targeting Information window report a high speed for the target 
INT= Intelligence. Past intell cutoff date. Remarks indicate this flag is also used to indicate needing additional intel data. 
MEN = Need mensuration data. 
? The reason the target was not fired on was not indicated and is not obvious from the operator remarks. 
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FIGURE 1. ACQUISITION TO LAWS INTERVAL 
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Figures 1 and 1A present the intervals between the sensor acquisition time and the time the target was 
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Figures 2 and 2A present the intervals between the time the target was received at LAWS and the time the 
Fired Report event was received at LAWS from the firer. W e n  there was no Fired report Event, the time 
the fire when ready command was transmitted to the firer was used in place of the Fired Report time. 
Figure 2 includes data for all nominators. Figure 2 A includes data only for the GSIRS-M nominator. 
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FIGURE 3. ACQUISITION TO FIRE INTERVAL 
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Figures 3 and 3A present the intervals between the sensor acquisition time and the time the Fired Report 
event was received at LAWS from the firer. When there was no Fired report Event, the time the f r e  when 
ready command was transmitted to the firer was used in place of the Fired Report time. The reported times 
represent lower limits to the engagement times for TCTs because of these missing Fired Report times and 
because weapon time of flight is not included. Figure 3 includes data for all nominators. Figure 3A includes 
data only for the GSIRS-M nominator. 
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TABLE 4. SENSOR TO ENGAGEMENT THREAD 
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iTLAM MLRS LASM ERGM TACAIR ? 
SAM = Surface to Air Missile 
CM = Cruise Missile position 
BM = Ballistic Missile position 
M = Missile position 
AAA = Air Defense Artillery position 
PTG = Patrol Boat, missile 
ATT Boat = Fast attack boat 
ACFT = aircraft 
AMMO DP = Ammo dump 
? = unknown 
PI = Photo Interpretation 
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TABLE 5. SENSOR TO ENGAGEMENT THREAD 
FOR THE PTW NOMINATOR 
SENSOR RPV ELINT 


















n L A M  MLRS LASM ERGM TACAIR '? 
2 1 
2 
1 2  1 
2 1  
1 
3 5 4  1 
SAM = Surface to Air Missile 
CM = Cruise Missile position 
BM = Ballistic Missile position 
M = Missile position 
A M  = Air Defense Artillery position 
PTG = Patrol Boat, missile 
ATT Boat = Fast attack boat 
ACFT = aircraft 
AMMO DP = Ammo dump 
? = unknown 



















TABLE 6. SENSOR TO ENGAGEMENT THREAD 
FOR THE JSWS NOMINATOR 
SLAR 






SAM = Surface to Air Missile 
CM = Cruise Missile position 
BM = Ballistic Missile position 
M = Missile position 
AAA = Air Defense Artillery position 
PTG = Patrol Boat, missile 
A l T  Boat = Fast attack boat 
ACFT = Aircraft 
AMMO DP =Ammo dump 
SLAR = Side Looking Airborne Radar 



















TABLE 7. SENSOR TO ENGAGEMENT THREAD 
FOR THE JSOTF NOMINATOR 
SEAL SR 




I 1  2 1 
SOF TM 






SAM = Surface to Air Missile 
CM = Cruise Missile position 
BM = Ballistic Missile position 
M = Missile position 
AAA = Air Defense Artillery position 
PTG = Patrol Boat, missile 
ATT Boat = Fast attack boat 
ACFT=Aircraft 
AMMO DP =Ammo dump 
? = unknown 
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TABLE 8. SENSOR TO ENGAGEMENT THREAD 




























2 1 1 
1 1 
19 2 9 3 
1 2 
LAWS nominators inc1ude:CEiF LAWS, JFK LAWS, 
JYG LAWS and DOCC LAWS. 
In almost all cases the acquiring sensor was not specified. 
SAM = Surface to Air Missile 
CM = Cruise Missile position 
BM = Ballistic Missile position 
M = Missile position 
AAA = Air Defense Artillery position 
PTG = Patrol Boat, missile 
A n  Boat = Fast attack boat 
ACFT = Aircraft 
AMMO DP =Ammo dump 
? = Unknown 
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ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVE DATA FBE G 
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Fleet Battle Experiment Golf Time Critical Targeting Process 
Information fkom the Land Attack Weapon System 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Land Attack Weapon System (LAWS) is one component in the detect-to-engage 
system used for Fleet Battle Experiment Golf (FBE-G). Its basic purpose is to develop 
weapon-target pairings from a variety of weapon and target information. When 
performing this function, information is ingested, processed, and disseminated and 
displayed, some of which is archived. It is possible to reconstruct Time Critical 
Targeting (TCT) information from the LAWS data. The purpose of this report is to 
present such information. 
There are limitations to using LAWS for analysis. First, LAWS does not contain all 
relevant TCT processing information. It is only one component in a larger system. 
During Golf, the LAWS display was disseminated to many operations nodes and used 
somewhat as a common operations picture (COP). Thus, the information in it is 
extensive, but still not complete. Second, not all information developed in LAWS is 
archived. 
Because of these limitations, one cannot expect to do a complete TCT analysis using 
LAWS data. Even so, such an analysis is valuable. We present here the results from this 
analysis, including such information as weapon use, percentage of targets engaged, 
percentage of targets engaged within the TCT dwell time, etc. These results must be 
interpreted carefully. For example, if the results show engagement times longer than the 
TCT dwell time, that is a fact. However, since not all events are recorded, the percentage 
of times this occurred is an indication of overall performance, not absolute statistics. 
One of the lessons learned from both Foxtrot and Golf is that a great deal more data 
should be archived from all of the systems that make up the Fires system, including the 
communications links. It is important to point out that the purpose of LAWS in these 
experiments has been to provide a weapon-target pairing process for the operator, not to 
provide data for the analyst. Thus, the lack of complete data should not be construed as a 
defect in the system. If the requirement for more complete data archiving is established, 
the system can be configured to meet that requirement. In order to achieve a complete 
analysis, this archiving requirement would have to be placed on the several systems that 
make up the Fires system including the supporting simulations. 
2. FIRES SYSTEM 
2.1. The TCT Process in FBE G 
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2.1.1. Sensor Cueing 
The sensors applied to the identification of TCTs were the two UAVs organic to each of 
the two CGs and the Global Hawk and Predator controlled from the IKE/JFACC. These 
sensors were cued to the areas to search through JSOF, JSWS, Gale-Lite or the Computer 
Aided TEL Search (CATS). 
2.1.2. Target Nomination 
UAV simulated imagery and telemetry were fed to the GCCS Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance Capability (GISRC) workstation on the engagement node owning 
the sensor. There is anecdotal evidence that there were significant delays in the receipt of 
some of these images at GISRC. There were also some initial problems getting the right 
image and matching telemetry data sent to the correct platform. The original experiment 
concept was for the GISRC to feed the same nomination to each of the shooter nodes 
(Anzio, CSG, CTF67, CTF69, VSSN, JFACC, IKE) with each node assigned a different 
target number for a given nomination. Due to s o h a r e  problems, this procedure did not 
work correctly and was not consistently employed in FBE G. The procedures actually 
used for distributing target nominations were: 
a. Multiple nominations from GISRC. Software problems made this approach 
unreliable. 
b. Nomination from GISRC manually delivered to LAWS. The LAWS then distributed 
the nomination, by ATI.ATR to each of the other LAWS shooter nodes. 
c. Nomination from GISRC (ATI.ATR) sent to LAWS. LAWS then distributed the 
nomination to all of the other LAWS shooter nodes. 
The problem of getting the nominations to all shooter nodes continued throughout the 
test. For the test as a whole, 3 1 % of all target nominations were sent to only a single 
LAWS shooter node. Even on the last day of experimentation 23 % of the nominations 
were received by only a single shooter node. Many nominations, though sent to more 
than one shooter node, were still not sent to all the shooter nodes; this was particularly a 
problem in the first few days of the experiment. 
A protocol evolved to allow participants to refer to the common nominated target even 
though each shooter platform was given a different target number for the target. For 
example, a single nomination was sent to each of the shooter nodes with target numbers 
GA 2053 through GA 2059 inclusive. Associated with each of these different target 
number was target was a common target description that identified the target as 
NODONG- GA2053. 
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2.1.3. Target Nomination Data Entry. 
The target nomination was created either by the GISRC or LAWS operator. In the former 
case, the data contained in the GISRC ATI.ATR message automatically populated the 
Targeting Information in the LAWS Viewing Fire Mission window. In the latter case, 
the Targeting Information was manually entered by the LAWS operator. The LAWS 
data indicates several problems with data entry. 
a. The acquisition time was frequently not entered. 
b. When entered, the acquisition time was often after the time the nomination was 
received at LAWS. Timing problems were attributable to the fact workstation clocks 
were not synchronized and, it appears, in some cases, that the acquisition time was 
entered as local time rather than GMT. 
c. The Not Later Than (NLT) time often did not appear in the LAWS Targeting 
Information. This may have resulted from a dwell time not being entered in GISRC. 
d. In LAWS, the Circular error (CE) and Linear Error (LE) derived from the 
mensuration were entered in the remarks cell in the Targeting Information. In a few 
cases the CE and LE values were reported in feet or meters. In most cases no units 
were specified. Standard units must be used. 
e. In a few cases the NLT year was entered as two digits rather than four. This resulted 
in the failure of the LAWS C2 clock. 
These problems can be dealt with by having the GISRC and LAWS software compel the 
entry of the required data and training the operators in entering the data in standard 
units. 
2.1.4. Dwell Time 
The Time Critical Targeting CONOPS for FBE G states “the threshold for timeliness of 
response varies from target to target. For threshold purposes TCT are grouped into three 
sets, each requiring engagement within a specified amount of time after detection. These 
thresholds have been set, for experimental convenience, at five, thirty and one hundred 
and twenty minutes, respectively”. Annex C. APP 2. TAB J, Time Standards for Mobile 
Targets gives, for each of the FBE G targets types a pre-fire, post-fire and total dwell 
time. These intervals are given as a function of experiment day (1-6) with the times 
decreasing as the experiment progresses. The total dwell times for most systems are in 
excess (often much in excess) of the maximum threshold interval specified in the TCT 
CONOPS. The GISRC operator, selects from the table the dwell time appropriate to the 
target type and day of experiment and enters it into the target nomination. The LAWS 
program, automatically computes an NLT time based on this dwell time. For LAWS, the 
“NLT is the time that LAWS receives the mission plus the target dwell time provided in 
the target message sent to LAWS” (ref. Land Attack Warfare System Fleet Battle 
Experiment Golf). A more accurate definition would have been to define the NLT time 
as the acquisition time plus the dwell time. However, In practice, this definition would 
not have been useful in FBE G since the operators often did not furnish the acquisition 
time. 
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The effect of a finite dwell time was simulated for a target by the JECG issuing 
instructions to the JSAF operators to hide the target after the expiration of the appropriate 
dwell time. 
2.1.5. Mensuration 
Simultaneous with the nomination of a target to LAWS, ATI.ATR nomination messages 
and image snapshots, were sent to a JTW or PTW+ workstation. In practice, because of 
the nomination software problems, the mensuration workstation did not always receive 
the nomination concurrently with LAWS. In some cases, the mensuration requests and 
images were hand carried to the local mensuration workstation. The general guidance 
was that if you were the target nominator and your associated mensuration work station 
had the necessary database, the target would be mensurated locally. But in some cases, 
the mensuration request was sent to all mensuration workstations. Sending of the 
nomination to all mensuration nodes had the effect of creating bidding for mensuration. 
In practice, each of the mensuration workstations had a terrain database for only a portion 
of the playing area so that for any given target only a limited number of workstations 
were capable of providing the mensurated data. The multiple mensuration requests also 
sometimes resulted in a target being mensurated more than once. All mensuration work 
stations had the capability to reach back to the other in-theatre workstations with the 
necessary databases to perform the mensuration or to reachback to ONI. Because of 
communication problems, only the PTW+ workstation (JFACC) effectively employed 
reachback for target mensuration. 
When the mensuration was completed, it was sent in an ATI.ATR update to LAWS. In 
practice, most mensuration data were hand carried to the local LAWS. Ideally, all 
LAWS would receive these mensuration data, but in practice only one LAWS (and one 
nomination) received the mensurated data. All other LAWS, and the other targets for a 
given nomination, had to have the target coordinates updated manually. In all cases, the 
CE/ LE data were automatically entered in the Targeting Information remarks. Ideally, 
the LAWS operator who received the mensuration data, would also manually update the 
mensuration information in each of the other target numbers corresponding to a given 
nomination. The mensuration data were also sent to the DTF where the data were 
manually entered. Mensuration data were accessed by users either by reviewing 
ATI.ATR messages received at LAWS or the DTF. 
A significant problem was alerting the LAWS operator when the mensuration data were 
available. Chat was employed, nevertheless operators would often waste valuable time in 
looking for mensurated data that was not yet available. Suggestions for improvements in 
this area include a LAWS color block to be set to green when the mensuration data have 
been transmitted. 
There is evidence that, because of the time required to obtain mensurated data, some 
missions were fired before the mensurated target position had been received. Certainly, 
the remarks cell in the LAWS Targeting Information often reports no or very low 
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accuracy CE/LE values. This was particularly true during the first few days of the 
experiment. 
Statistics collected on the mensuration process in FBE G show that during a typical day 
for the experiment the four mensuration workstations (JTWs on ANZ, CSG and IKE, 
PTW+ at the JFACC) did an average of eight mensurations with an average mensuration 
time of about nine minutes. It would appear mensuration capabilities were not stressed. 
Reach back for mensuration data was essentially not employed except by the PTW+ in 
the JFACC. In only a single case did a JTW successfully employ reach back (CSG, in- 
theater reach back, processing time 55 minutes). For the PTW+, the average mensuration 
time for reachback to in-theatre databases was six minutes (six instances) and for 
reachback to ON1 databases was nine minutes (55 instances). 
2.1.6. Digital Target Folder (DTF) 
When a target was nominated the nomination was sent to the DTF cell where the DTF for 
the target was manually created by the DTF operators. This was a slow process and 
impacted the servicing of TCTs when it became a requirement that a target could not be 
fired on until a DTF had been created for it. As a consequence, other nodes took on the 
creation of the DTFs themselves. Sofhvare is needed to automatically create the DTF 
from the ATI.ATR message. 
The primary vaIue of the DTF was in providing participants with mensurated data and 
BDA. It was time consuming to access to the DTF and frustrating to the user when he 
discovered that needed information had not yet been posted. 
2.1.7. Rapid Planning Mode (RPM) 
When processing a TLAM/TTLAM nomination, LAWS requests the missile route from 
RPM. The four RPM work stations employed in FBE G (ANZ, CSG, C6F, NUWC 
VSSN) received a total of 350 route requests (excluding mis-formatted requests) over the 
duration of the experiment (April 5-1 1). Each workstation received from 1 to 34 route 
requests per day with an average of about 13 requests per workstation per day. With 
average route generation time being 1 min 56 seconds (range 39 secs to 6 min 25 secs), 
route generating assets were generally not stressed. It is estimated that only on 10 to 15 
occasions was a workstation compelled to queue route requests. 
2.1.8. TGT Action 
Each LAWS system evaluated the nomination it received. The process of that evaluation 
was indicated in the TGT Element Approval block on the LAWS Missions Coordination: 
- Fires display. If, for any of a variety of reasons, it was decided not to engage the target 
the shooter turned the TGT block red and the reason the mission was denied was inserted 
















TARGET LOCATION IS IN WATER 
NOT DESIRED EFFECT 
NOT HIGH VALUE. DOES NOT MEET ATTACK GUIDANCE 
REDUNDANT TARGET. TGT ALREADY BEING PROCESSED 
EFFECTS NOT ACHIEVED. WEAPON SYSTEM NOT EFFECTIVE 
TARGET OUT OF RANGE 
PAST INTELL CUTOFF DATE 
NO FIRE AREA 
RESTRICTED FIRE AREA 
FRIENDLIES IN AREA 
ROUTE IN CONFLICT 
TARGET OLD. TARGET DWELL TIME EXCEEDED 
AIRSPACE COORD AREA 
RESTRICTED TARGET 
If the mission was conditionally approved, but was waiting for additional information, 
e.g. mensuration data, the TGT block was turned yellow. If the mission was accepted, all 
required data were available, and the mission was ready to be fired, the TGT block was 
turned green. 
2.1.9. C2 Clock 
A new feature of LAWS introduced in FBE G to support the distributed TCT engagement 
concept was the C2 clock. For a nominated target, LAWS should receive a dwell time 
with the nomination and with that compute a NLT time for the target (NLT time = the 
time the nomination was received at LAWS plus the dwell time). Subtracting the 
Estimated Time to Engage (ETTE) from the NLT time gives what was termed the 
Maximum C2 Command Decision Time. 
The C2 clock was set using the C2 Command Decision Time, which is a sub-interval of 
the Maximum C2 Command Decision Time. Contained in LAWS was a table that 
provided a C2 Command Decision Time as a function of the target type and the 
Maximum C2 Decision Time. When the LAWS operator turned the TGT block green, 
LAWS then calculated the C2 Decision time and initiated the C2 clock countdown in the 
Mission Coordination: Fires display. It was incumbent upon the command element to set 
the CMD approval block to the desired status for a given target number/shooter before 
the C2 clock reached zero. 
Figure 1. 
LAWS C2 Clock Timeline 
Nomination 
received 
I Max C2 Decision Time I ETTE 
NLT 
NLT = Time Nomination received at LAWS + dwell time 
ETTE = weapon spin up time, time of flight and C2 time both on and off the platform 
Max C2 Decision Time interval = NLT - ETTE 
In FBE G there were several circumstances that resulted in the C2 clock not operating 





No NLT time was entered. 
No target type was entered or the target type entered was not one of the specific 
LAWS target types. 
The operator did not enter a full 4 digit year in the NLT time. 
If the CMD approval block was initially made red, the clock would not activate if it 
was changed to another color. 
2.1.10. CMD Action: Command by Negation. 
Each shooter node independently applied LAWS to the nomination furnished 
specifically to that shooter. If the target was engageable and all fire constraints had been 
met (mensuration of necessary accuracy, TLAM route data, etc). The shooter 
engagement cell would turn the LAWS TGT approval block green. If the CMD approval 
block was turned green, the shooter was free to fire immediately, if the CMD block was 
turned red or yellow, he was prohibited from firing. If however, the C2 clock timed out 
and no CMD action had been taken, the CMD block would automatically turn green and 
the shooter was free to fire. 
It is believed that distributed engagements with command by negation operated more 
readily early in the experiment. As the experiment progressed, there appeared to be a 
tendency for centralized control to be exerted. In part, this was the result of the fact the 
C2 clock often did not work (see 2.1.9), in effect depriving the commander of any 
opportunity to evaluate his subordinates missions. Consequently, the command blocks 
would sometimes be immediately turned red for all shooters (this was especially the case 
on April 10 and 11) and shooters would tend to request permission to fire. This tendency 
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to centralized control was also manifested by the requirement that a nomination must 
have a DTF before it could be fired on. 
2.1.11. BDA 
In FBE G TTLAM missions were transmitted from LAWS through the C4IGW to 
STOW/JSAF. The simulation flew the missile to the target and performed a casualty 
assessment. In principle, a sensor would be routed to view the target after the strike to 
provide BDA. In practice, ship UAVs were generally kept on station from target 
detection to missile impact. In FBE G, BDA was based on an arbitrary evaluation by the 
JECG. 
For other weapons, TLAM, LASM, ERGM, the fire events were not sent to, and hence 
not flown out, by JSAF. The assessment of these targets was performed by the manual 
injection of surrogate weapons by JSAF operators. 
The BDA assessment was entered into the DTF folder. 
2.2. LAWS Data Flow 




Target acquisition time 
Target acquisition source (e.g. ELINT, UAV) 
Target type (must correspond to one of the LAWS defined types) 
Target location (e.g. longitude and latitude) 
Target altitude 
Target dwell time 
Other data may be included (e.g. target size, location error) but, in practice, they were 
usually absent. 
When the LAWS operator exercises the Weapon Target Pairing function for a selected 
mission, LAWS provides a list of Weapon Target Pairing Options. In the context of FBE 
G, these options include those weapon for the platform associated with a specific LAWS 
workstation. LAWS does not provide the optimum weapon-target pairing, it is up to the 
operator to assign a specific weapon fiom the presented options to fire the mission:The 
mission is not ready to be fired until the necessary supporting data have been received. 
These usually include the mensuration data from the JTW/F'TW+ workstation which are 
normally received by LAWS as an updated ATI.ATR message. LAWS automatically 
enters the CE and LE for the mensurated position into the remarks cell in Targeting 
Information. In the case of a TTLAM/TLAM mission, the LAWS operator must transmit 




When all the data necessary to support a mission have been received, the LAWS operator 
turns the TGT block green and when CMD clearance to fire is given (or defaulted) the 
mission is initiated by the LAWS operator executing the fire command. 
2.3. LAWS Display 
The LAWS displays are discussed from the perspective of post experiment data analysis. 
The displays described, and the data elements enumerated, constitute the LAWS data 
used in the TCT data analysis contained in this report. 
2.3.1. Mission Coordination: Fires 
The key LAWS display is Mission Coordination: Fires. This lists, at all LAWS 
terminals, all the target nominations distributed to all LAWS nodes. The key information 






In real time, the display also features the C2 countdown clock, but this is zeroed out in 
the post experiment display. 
The display also exhibits the element approval blocks (TGT, CMD), the fire mission 
status block (WRD) and the Fired Status block (FRD). When examined post experiment, 
these blocks exhibit their final state in the experiment. 
Most of the details of a mission are accessible from the Mission Coordination: Fires 
display. Selecting a mission will open the Viewing Fire Mission window which displays 
Targeting Information which ideally will include the following data: 
Target number 
Target nominator 
Target acquisition time 




Target NLT time 
Mensuration CE and LE (in remarks) 
The Viewing Fire Mission window also contains Firing Information which normally 
includes: 
Firing unit 
Firing unit position 
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Munition fired 
Number of rounds fired in the mission. 
For a mission selected in the Mission Coordination: Fires display, selecting the 
Reports/Mission Times function will display the Mission Timeline Report. This display 
reports the times of various events during the prosecution of the target. These nominally 
include: 
Nomination received at LAWS. 
TGT action 
CMD action 
Transmission of On Call (OC) fire command 
Transmission of fire When Ready (WR) command 
Receipt of Fired Report (FRD) 
In practice, as described in Section 6 ,  events that should be present are frequently absent 
and the event time tags are sometimes inconsistent. 
2.3.2. Mission Coordination: TLAM 
Missions involving either TTLAM, TLAM or LASM munitions should appear in the - 
Mission Coordination: TLAM display as well as the Mission Coordination: Fires display. 
The information in the former display is similar to the latter with the following 
exceptions : 
VLS cell firing mission 
The status of route data 
Status block (fired, retargeted, assigned, launch required, ready) 
Selecting a mission in the Mission Coordination: TLAM displays the TLAM Mission 
window which presents additional mission data. These include: 
Loiter point Location 
Target location 
Retargeting target number 
Retargeting aimpoint 
Time of launch 
Estimated Time to Engage (ETE) 
In many instances TTLAM missions found in Mission Coordination: Fires do not appear 
in Mission Coordination: TLAM so that, particularly for loitering TTLAM missions, 
important mission data are lost. Even when a TTLAM mission appears in both displays, 
the data in the two displays are sometimes inconsistent (see Section 6). Further, the data 
in the TLAM mission window are often deficient. For example, the time of launch and 
ETE are almost never reported and the target location and loiter point location are often 
the same position. 
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2.3.3. Mission Coordination: TACAIR 
Missions involving TACAIR should appear in the Mission Coordination: TACAIR 







Mission approval blocks (C6F, JFM, JFC) 
Mission status block (FLN) 
Selecting a mission in the Mission Coordination: TACAIR display, brings up the 
Viewing TACAIR Mission window. The most important additional mission data in this 
displays are: 
The number and type of aircraft flying the mission 
The number and type of munitions the aircraft will deliver. 
Unfortunately, the majority of TACAIR mission do not appear in the Mission 
Coordination: TACAIR display and when they do, the mission status is usually 
inconsistent with that displayed in Mission Coordination: Fires (see Section 6). 
2.4. LAWS Useas aCOP 
During the course of the experiment, the operators recognized that LAWS was one of the 
best sources of battlefield situational awareness they had available and they began to use 
LAWS as a default COP. We do not report on such use here, but it does illustrate that, 
regardless of what system is used to provide the COP, it must present much of the 
information that is present in the LAWS display. 
3. TCT PROSECUTION TIME 
3.1. LAWS Data and Elapsed Times 
The LAWS data used in the analysis of TCT timing include: 
Datum Source 
Target acquisition time 
NLT time 
Time nomination at LAWS 
Transmission of OC cmd 
Transmission of WR cmd 
Receipt of Fired Report 
Mission Coordination: Fires/ Targeting Information 
Mission Coordination: Fires/ Targeting Information 
Mission Coordination: Fires/ Mission Timeline Report 
Mission Coordination: Fires/ Mission Timeline Report 
Mission Coordination: Fires/ Mission Timeline Report 
Mission Coordination: Fires/ Mission Timeline Report 
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The problems encountered with these data are described in Section 6 .  
3.2 Results from LAWS 
3.2.1. Timeline Data 
Timeline analysis in this report is limited to two intervals in the TCT engagement 
process: the interval between target acquisition time and the time the nomination was 
received at LAWS (Acq - LAWS interval) and the interval between the receipt of the 
nomination at LAWS and the fire command/fire event (LAWS - Fire interval). 
3.2.1.1. Acq - LAWS Interval 
The Acq - LAWS intervals were calculated using the target acquisition time and the time 
the nomination was received by LAWS as reported in the LAWS Missions Coordination: 
Fires Viewing Fire Mission window in Targeting Information. In many cases, the 
acquisition time was not reported (in no case was it reported when a LAWS station or the 
ANZ or CSG GISRC workstations were the nominators). When acquisition times were 
reported, in some cases the acquisition occurred after the time the nomination was 
received at LAWS. The conclusion is that the clocks of several GISRC workstations 
were incorrectly set. Specifically, 
1. For the GS and GI nominators the Acq - LAWS interval is typically about -50 
minutes. It is assumed their clocks were off by one hour. Correcting for that, the mean 
Acq - LAWS interval for these workstations becomes about +9 minutes. 
The few values for the GC nominator look plausible with a mean interval of about +14 
minutes. 
For the GJ nominator, the interval is typically about -6 minutes for April 5-6 and about 
+10 minutes for April 7-1 1. This is interpreted to mean the clock was in error for the 
first few days of the experiment and was corrected on the 7th. 
As a consequence, the analysis of the Acq - LAWS interval is based on the values for the 
GS and GI nominations with one hour added and the values for GC and GJ (limited to 
post April 6 observations) as they appear in the raw data. For the 36 data points used, the 
average Acq - LAWS interval was 9.1 minutes and the median interval was 6.5 minutes. 
This compares with a median time of 23 minutes found in FBE F (see Table 1). The data 
from FBE F were reformulated to be more comparable to the FBE G data. The median 
value for the FBE F data was determined by dropping those values where the interval 
exceeded 90 minutes. Many of these large values are likely to be in error. If these values 
are included, the median for the FBE F data climbs to 3 1 minutes increasing the disparity 
with the FBE G data. 
The short Acq - LAWS interval in FBE G is at least partially attributable to the 
collocation of GISRC and LAWS in each of the shooter engagement cells. It is important 
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to note that the nomination was generally not actionable upon receipt at LAWS since the 
target would not yet have been mensurated. 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF FBE F AND FBE G ACQ -LAWS INTERVALS 
EXPERIMENT 1 # O B S  AVG ~ MEDIAN 
FBE G 1 36 I 9.1 6.5 
1 IFBE F i 30 i 27.3 ~ 23 I 
I 
AVG and Median are in minutes 1 I 
3.2.1.2. LAWS - Fire Interval 
The LAWS data do not report a time of fire. To approximate the interval from receipt of 
the nomination at LAWS until fire, we are compelled to use other fire-related events 
reported by LAWS. The LAWS Mission Timeline Reports may report the following fire- 
related events: the transmission of the fire On Call (OC) command, the transmission of 
the fire When Ready (WR) command and the Fired Report (FRD). Unfortunately, these 
events are not consistently reported, some engagement timelines reported all three of 
these events, some none, while most reported one or two. In cases where more than one 
event was reported it was sometimes obvious that one of the event times was in error. 
For example, where an OC command event and a Fired Report were reported the OC 
event time tag could be several hours after the time of the Fired Report. Where data 
appeared to be obviously in error they were excluded from this analysis. However, it is 
highly probable that erroneous data, particularly some of those exhibiting very large 
intervals, remain in the sample. For this reason, the analysis was repeated excluding all 
intervals of greater than 90 minutes. Table 2 presents the FBE G data compared with 
reformatted data from the FBE G analysis. The first portion of the table shows the results 
where the LAWS - Fire intervals greater than 90 minutes have been excluded. 
Comparing the FBE F and FBE G data for the LAWS - Fired Report (FRD) intervals the 
results are very similar. But comparing the values for the LAWS - WR intervals for the 
two experiments, the data surprisingly show shorter intervals in FBE F. In FBE F, 
mensuration was a bottleneck. In FBE G, three JTW and one PTW+ workstation 
appeared to successhlly distribute the mensuration effort resulting in an average 
mensuration time of 8.9 minutes. Why this did not result in a reduction in the LAWS - 
WR interval in FBE G is not clear. 
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TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF FBE F AND FBE G LAWS-FIRE INTERVALS 
I EXLUDES ALL OBSERVATION WITH INTERVAL > 90 
I 
IEXPERlMENT I"FIRE" EVENT i # OBS 1 AVG MEDIAN 
WR 30 1 27 ' 26 
FRD I 52 41.1 37 
i I 1 
I I 
FBE F I WR 40 1 21.2 1 16 
FRD 1 16 I 38.8 1 39 




ALL OBSERVATIONS INCLUDED I 
I I i , I I 
FBE G IOC 1 105 i 41.1 ~ 19 ~~ - 
i , 
IWR I 34 34 1 30.5 
IFRD ~ 80 1 93.5 1 67 
! i I 
The Fire events are : OC - issuance of On Call fire command 
WR - issuance of When ready fire command 
FRD - receiDt of fired reDort. I 
lOC events were not reported in FBE F. I ~ 
IAVG and Median are in minutes ~ 
3.2.1.3. Acquire to Fire Times. 
Table 3 presents the total median intervals between acquisition and the WR and Fired 
Report events excluding observation with intervals of greater than 90 minutes. These 
times show an improvement in FBE G with respect to FBE F which is entirely due to 
shorter acquisition to nomination times. 
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TABLE 3 
MEDIAN ACQUISTION TO FIRE TIMES 
EXPERIMENT ACQ-WR ACQ-FRD 
FBE F 39 62 
FBE G I 32.5 143.5 
Times are in minutes 
3.2.2. Dwell Times 
Dwell time is the intelligence determined theoretical interval of time available to strike a 
target measured from the time it arrives at a position until it again moves or hides. A 
critical measure of the success of an engagement is whether a target was hit before the 
expiration of its dwell time. Because of the importance of this parameter, we use it here 
to segment the data. In FBE G, the dwell time of a target was determined, by 
participants, from predefined tables where it was specified as a function of target type 
and day of experiment. The dwell time was normally inserted in the nomination data by 
the GISRC operator. We extracted the dwell time values from the LAWS data as 
described below. 
LAWS defined the Not Later Than (NLT) time as: 
NLT = Time nomination received at LAWS + Dwell Time. 
This definition gives an unrealistically late NLT. A better definition would determine 
NLT with respect to the target acquisition time. We recovered the dwell time from the 
LAWS data by subtracting the time the nomination was received at LAWS from the NLT 
time reported in LAWS. 
3.2.2.1. Fired Engagements that Satisfied the NLT 
Table 4 presents, as a function of dwell time, the number of fired engagements that 
satisfied the target NLT time, 
possibly satisfied the NLT time, and 
did not satisfy the NLT time. 
To be included in this table, an engagement had to have a NLT time reported in LAWS 
and the LAWS timeline had to report one of the events that approximated the weapon fire 
time. In order of preference, they are: 
Fired Report event (FRD), 
LAWS transmission of the fire When Ready (WR) command, 
LAWS transmission of the fire On Call (OC) command. 
In the majority of cases, only the WR or OC events were available to define the fire time, 
and these events could occur a number of minutes before the actual fire event. In 
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addition, the projectile times of flight (TOF) were not directly available. As a result of 
these uncertainties, in some cases it was not possible to unambiguously determine if an 
engagement did or did not meet the NLT time constraint. In Table 4, the following 
relationships are used to define whether the NLT time was met. 
The NLT time was satisfied (NLT met) if: 
NLT - (the event defining fire time) >= 30 minutes for TTLAM/TLAM 
>= 10 minutes for other weapons. 
It was uncertain if the NLT time was satisfied (NLT met?) if: 
NLT - (the event defining fire time) >O and <= 30 minutes for TTLAM/TLAM 
>O and <=lo minutes for other weapons. 
The NLT time was not satisfied (NLT not met) if: 
NLT - (the event defining fire time) <=O. 
The LAWS data include firer and target position data. Therefore, using munition TOF 
tables, the TOF time for the projectile for the engagements could be determined. 
Calculating the projectile TOF would likely have the effect of moving some of the 
uncertain cases into the NLT not met column. However, there is no way to deal with the 
uncertainty in the interval between the OC or WR events and the actual time of fire so the 
indeterminacy would presumably remain for many engagements. We have not added 
TOF to the total engagement time. 
The last column of Table 4 includes data for targets that were not engaged but which had 
a reported NLT time. 
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TABLE 4 
ENGAGEMENT NLT STATUS AS A FUNCTION OF DWELL TIME 
DWELL 1 NLT met 1 NLT met? 'NLT not met 1 Not fired iTotals 
<5 4 1  15 15 34 j 
5 4 0  I 1 3 ' 3 1 7 1  
1 0 4 5  1 I 2 I 1 / I 1  I 4  
I 
2 5 ~ 3 0  ~ 1 1 i  
3 0 ~ 6 0  5 2 1  10 1 7  1 2 4 :  
60<120 1 5 I 1 4 ' 7 i 1 7 1  
2<3 I 15 ' 1 1 ~ 10 27 I 
3<4 ' 17 4 1  i 9 1 3 0 i  
4 4  0 31 I 3 3 18 j 55 
1 0 4 5  ~ I 0~ 
15<20 1 1 1 I 1 I 
TOTALS I 78 19 I 39 I 80 I 216 I 
Solumns: 1 I I 
DWELL: NLT time - time received at LAWS rounded to nearest minute. 
K T  met: NLT - fire time >= 30 minutes for l-rLAM/TLAM, >=lo minutes other weapons. 
Time in minutes to 120, for >= 120 minutes time in hours. 
VLT met ?: NLT - fire time >O and < 30 minutes for l-rLAM/TLAM, 4 0  minutes other weapons. 






%t fired. Missions that were not fired I ~ 
As Table 4 suggests, engaging targets which have dwell times of less than 30 minutes, 
within the NLT, is difficult. The ability to do so is a measure of the responsiveness of 
the Fires system. Thus, we treat such targets as a special case. Table 5 includes details 
of the 29 fired engagements which had dwell times of less than 30 minutes. 
Seven of the eight engagements in which it was uncertain if the NLT time was met 
occurred in the first two days of the experiment. For those seven engagements, the NLT- 
Fire Time was four minutes or less. For all of these firings the events available to 
approximate the fire event were the OC or WR events, and for six of the seven it was the 
OC fire command, the one most remote from the actual fire event. Considering the 
unknown intervals between these fire commands and the actual fire event plus the 
weapon TOF, it appears unlikely that these weapons reached the target prior to the NLT 
time. Also, as discussed above, the NLT time, as defined by LAWS, is unrealistically 
late so that the definition of success is biased in favor of the shooter. 
This analysis only addresses whether the projectile impacted at the target position earlier 
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than the computed NLT time, it does not address whether the target was at the position at 
that time. 
TABLE 5 
ALL ENGAGEMENTS WITH DWELL <30 MINUTES 
Dwell 1 Weapon I Fire Time Source ICULE ~ NLT - Fire Time I Fired Cmd -LAWS NLT Eva1 Date 
12 I LASM oc 100/100 4 8 OC 3 5 
12 I TTLAM oc 1 00/100 3 9 oc I 3 I 5  
4 i TTLAM oc 100/100 -45 I -1 oc i N 1 5  
4 , ERGM 1 WR 100/100 -2 I 6 W R  i N ! 5  
4 I LASM i oc 100/100 1 2 2 oc 3 1 6  
4 I LASM ~ oc 100/100 , 2 2 oc i 3 1 6  
3 w R  ? ' 6  
38 FRD N 1 6  
4 ERGM 1 WR 100/100 i 1 I 
FRD I 100/100 1 -32 I 6 ERGM 
4 1 LASM 1 oc 100/100 , 3 1 oc i ? 1 6  
1 
1 6 LASM 1 oc I 3 3 oc I ? i 6  
3 ~ ERGM wR 1 10.8/11.3 1 -28 31 WR I N  7 
6 I ERGM I WR 1 11Z17.2 I -24 30 WR N 1 7  
4 I LASM I oc I 96/10.? 1 -36 40 OC N 1 7  
25 1 ERGM WR 1 109/11.4 I 6 19 WR 1 3  l 8  
2 ERGM WR I 12.6/18.2 1 -1 3 15 WR I N  8 
18 1 ERGM I WR 134/184 1 -52 I 70 WR 1 N , 8  
17 LASM I oc 10 i -57 74 oc I N 1 8  
3 LASM oc 1 11/11 1 -1 9 22 oc I N 1 8  
28 WR I N 1 8  
14 WR N 1 8  
2 ERGM , WR 1 10/11 j -26 I 
5 ERGM WR I 10.8A1.6 I -9 I 
2 ERGM I WR I 10/10 -9 I 11 WR 1 N 1 8  
1 LASM j oc 8/8 -12 13 OC I N  9 
1 LASM I FRD 9/10 -36 I 37FRD I N  9 
12 LASM FRD 8/9 -1 8 1 30 FR i N  10 
2 LASM FRD -35 I 37 oc I N  10 I I 
1 ~ LASM oc 1 10/10 1 -36 37 oc N 1 10 
24 wR 1 N 1 1 1  
15 OC N I 11 
2 ~ ERGM 1 WR 1 10/11.4 1 -22 I 
1 I LASM ' oc I 3.1/3 1 -24 I I 1 ITLAMI  FRD i 8.5r8.8 1 -73 I 74 FRD , N  11 
I I 
I 
IDwell: NLT time -time received at LAWS rounded to nearest minute ' 
I Weapon: Weapon fired ~ i I Fire Time Source: The LAWS timeline event eauated to the fire time: In order of preference FRD=Fired report, 
WR=Fire When Ready command, OC=Fire On Call command. 1 I 
CULE: Circular Error/Linear Error. Mensuration accuracy reported in LAWS Targeting Information remarks. 
NLT- Fire time. The interval between NLT and the event listed in column 3 rounded to the nearest minute. 
Fire Cmd - LAWS: The time of the fire command - the time the nomination was received by LAWS. 
The type fire command used is noted. In order of preference they are WR, OC and FRD. ~ 
NLT Eval: NLT evaluation from Table 4. N = NLT not met, ? = uncertain if NLT met. 
Date. Experiment day in April from which data came. I I I 
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3.2.2.2. Mensuration 
The CE and LE values from the mensuration process are automatically reported in the 
LAWS Targeting Information remarks. For almost all engagements in Table 5 for April 
5 and 6 the CE/LE values reported are 100/100 implying the targets were not mensurated. 
For nine of the ten targets, with dwell times of 12 minutes or less, fired on during the first 
two days of the experiment, the average interval between the nomination being received 
at LAWS and a fire command being issued by LAWS was less than four minutes. Given 
that the average time to mensurate a target using an organic database was 8.9 minutes 
(this is the time to mensurate at the JTW/PTW+ given receipt of the request, and does not 
include possible communication delays), it is not surprising that these engagements, with 
fire commands issued within about four minutes of the receipt of the nomination, were 
fired unmensurated. 
For those 18 cases in Table 5 where the LAWS Targeting Information indicates the 
targets were mensurated, the average time it took to issue a fire command after the 
nomination was received at LAWS was about 27 minutes (median time 24 minutes). 
With one possible exception, all these engagements failed to meet the target NLT times. 
4. WEAPON USE 
4.1. LAWS Data and Weapon Use 
The sources of the data used in deriving the nomination and engagement statistics are: 
Datum Source 
Nominations Mission Coordination: Fires 
Nominations engaged Mission Coordination: Fires 
Mission Coordination: TLAM 
TTLAM/TLAM retargeting Mission Coordination: TLAM 
CE/LE Mission Coordination: FiredTargeting Info 
Rounds fired Mission Coordination: Fires/Firing Info 
4.2. LAWS Results 
4.2.1. Nomination and Engagement Statistics 
Table 6 contains the summary statistics, as a function of experiment day, for the LAWS 
data collected in FBE G. To be included as a fired engagement, the criterion was that the 
Fired Status block (FRD) in the Mission Coordination: Fires display had to be green. 
This fire criterion was not applied to some TTLAM engagements. Details of defining a 
fired TTLAM mission are presented in Section 4.2.2. The low number of nominations 
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In FBE G, the intent was for every nomination to be distributed to every shooter node for 
evaluation. The original plan was for the distribution to be performed automatically by 
GISRC. Because of software problems, the distribution of the nominations was 
performed imperfectly by GISRC. As a fall back, many of the nominations were 
distributed manually from LAWS. As a consequence of these difficulties, in many cases 
(30.6%) only a single shooter received the target nomination. In many other cases, the 
nomination went to more than one, but not all, of the shooters. This problem continued 
throughout the experiment. Even on the last day of the experiment, 23 percent of the 
nominations were still being sent to only a single node. 
Over the duration of the experiment only 56.1% of the nominated targets were engaged. 
As the day by day data in Table 6 show, this rate remained more or less constant over the 
duration of the experiment. Non engagement of some of the targets is attributable to an 
“end of day” phenomenon - the tendency for targets nominated late in the day not to be 
prosecuted. This is particularly notable for April 5-7. If, as intended, each of the target 
nominations was distributed to each of the shooter nodes it likely the number of 
nominations engaged would have increased. 
The number of engagements shown in Table 6 is greater than the number of nominations 
engaged since, in a number of cases, more than one shooter engaged a nominated target. 
Table 6 contains a breakdown of the weapons employed in FBE G. Weapons employed 




LASM 15.1% and 
SLAM-ER 2.2%. 
Table 7 contains a more detailed accounting showing the weapons fired as a function of 
platform. The data in these tables are not round counts. They count an engagement by a 
specific platform of a specific target nomination as a single engagement regardless of the 
number of rounds fired. In many ERGM engagements multiple rounds were fired (see 
Section 4.2.3) and, in a few cases, multiple rounds were also fired in TTLAM 
engagements. Specific munitions expenditures are not addressed for TACAIR missions 
since most TACAIR missions failed to appear in the LAWS Mission Coordination: 
TACAIR mission list where the specific aircraft and munitions employed in an 
engagement are defined. Table 7 includes a few instances where LAWS reported 
inappropriate platform-target pairings: CTF67/ERGM, CVW/TTLAM and CVW/SLAM- 
ER. 
The dominance of the CSG (73 total firings) with respect to the Anzio (34 total firings), 
is due, at least in part, to the greater reliability of the CSG LAWS connectivity. 
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TABLE 7 
FIRE MISSIONS BY PLATFORM, WEAPON AND DATE 
4.2.2. Tomahawk Data 
Inclusion of a TTLAM/TLAM firing in Tables 6 and 7 required that: 
Fired Status block (FRD) in the Mission Coordination: Fires display 
be green as with the other weapons, or 
the status reported in the Mission Coordination: TLAM mission list 
be Fired or Retargeted (color blue or green). 
Occasionally, the data reported in the two tables were not consistent. There were 
missions with FRD green in Mission Coordination: Fires but status not Fired or 
Retargeted in Mission Coordination: TLAM. Conversely, there were some cases where 
the status was Fired or Retargeted in Mission Coordination: TLAM but FRD was not 
green in Mission Coordination: Fires. If either mission list listed the mission as fired, it 
was counted as fired. 
Interpretation of the TTLAM/TLAM data is further complicated by the fact that many 
TTLAM/TLAM missions do not appear in the Mission Coordination: TLAM mission 
list. The Mission Coordination: TLAM list contains data about a LAWS mission that are 
not otherwise obtainable. These include the munition specification. All the 
TTLAM/TLAM missions are listed as TTLAM in the Mission Coordination: Fires list, 
only in the Mission Coordination: TLAM list will the munition be specified as BLK3 
TLAM-C where appropriate. The latter mission list also provides the coordinates of the 
Target, Loiter Point and Retargeting aimpoints. 
A TTLAM mission was considered to be fired at a loiter point if the target description in 
Mission Coordination: Fires referred to a loiter point or if the targeting information from 
Mission Coordination: TLAM contained a loiter point position. As discussed above, 
many TTLAM missions did not appear in the latter list so it is possible some TTLAM 
loiter missions were not recognized. Table 8 displays TTLAM missions (the five 
missions identified as firing BLK3 TLAM-C were excluded) by type, date and platform. 
The mission types are defined as follows: 
Non Loiter. A mission is considered to be a non-loitering mission if there was no 
indication in the Mission Coordination: Fires target description that 
the mission was fired at a loiter point and, if the mission was reported in 
Mission Coordination: TLAM , no loiter point or retargeting coordinates 
were reported. 
Loiter Unknown. The mission is known to be a loiter point mission, based on the target 
description, but is does not appear in the Mission Coordination: TLAM list and, 
as a result, it is not known whether it went to a default target or was retargeted. 
Loiter: Target Box. The mission is known to be a loiter mission but in Mission 
Coordination: TLAM a position was entered only in the target position and 
the loiter point and retargeting coordinates are empty, or the loiter point and 
retargeting coordinates were the same as the target position. This is interpreted 
to mean that the missile impacted at the loiter box coordinates. 
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Loiter: Default target. The mission is known to be a loiter mission and a target 
position and a different loiter box position are entered in Mission 
Coordination: TLAM . This is interpreted to mean the missile impacted 
at the default target. 
EXPERIMENT DAY 
TARGET PRIORITY 5 6 7 8 1 9 ; l O  11 
/ l o /  8 9 1  3 1 
' 3 ; 2 ; 2 ,  2 i  ~ 
2 1 1  I 1 3 ;  
1 
3 8 
4 1 i 
I 
I I 3  
TOTALS 9 ' 1 4 ~ 1 0 ( 1 1 ~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 4  
Loiter: Retarget. The mission is known to be a loiter mission. Coordinates are 
entered in the target position, loiter point position, and retargeting in 
Mission Coordination: TLAM and the positions are different. This is 







The LAWS data in Table 8 show that only 27 of the 78 TTLAM missions (35%) were 
loitering missions and only five of the 27 (1 9%) were retargeted to higher priority targets. 
As Table 8 also shows, during the first few days of the experiment, almost no loitering 
missions were fired. Limiting consideration to the last four days of the experiment (April 
8-1 l), 25 of 46 TTLAM missions (54%) were loitering. 
The interpretation of the TTLAM data are clouded by the inconsistencies between 
Mission Coordination: TLAM and Mission Coordination: Fires and the fact that critical 
data are lacking for the missions that do not appear in the former list (41% of the 
TTLAM missions and 30% of the loitering TTLAM missions, do not appear in Mission 
Coordination: TLAM). Nevertheless, the LAWS data do suggest that a low percentage of 
the loitering TTLAMs were retargeted to high priority targets. 
4.2.2.2. Priority of TTLAM Targets 
Table 9 presents the priority of targets engaged by TLAM and non-loitering TTLAM 
missions. Priority 1 and 2 targets were engaged in 63% of the engagements. For the 
four cases where a loitering TTLAM was retargeted to a target of known priority, the 
priority of all targets was priority 1, 
TABLE 9 
PRIORITY OF TARGET FOR TLAM AND NON LOITERING TTLAM MISSIONS 
44 
...... 
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Only ERGM engagements frequently used multiple rounds against a given target. A 
priori, the expectation would be that the number of rounds used in an engagement should 
be inversely related to the accuracy of the mensurated target position. Figure 2 is a plot 
of the number of ERGM rounds fired against a target as a function of target CE as 
reported in LAWS. 
FIGURE 2 
RELATION BETWEEN ROUNDS FIRED IN A MISSION AND 
TARGET CIRCULAR ERROR 
t 




The points plotted in Figure 2 are limited to experiment days April 7-1 1 since for most 
ERGM engagements during the first two days of the experiment LAWS reported no 
mensuration or poorly mensurated target positions. The above plot indicates no 
correlation between the number of rounds fired at a target and the accuracy of the CE of 
the mensurated target position. 
4.2.4. Munitions Not Fired 
The great majority of the nominations distributed to shooters in the experiment did not 
result in a firing. It is important to understand why. Some data relating to the mission 
denial rational is found in the denial codes that appear in the Mission Coordination: Fires 
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approval blocks. The denial reason are defined in Section 2.1.8. In many cases there was 
no red approval block, so there is no indication why the mission was not fired. In many 
other cases, there was a red approval block indicating the mission was denied but it 
contained no code giving the reason for the denial. Table 10 displays a frequency count 
for each of the denial codes. The great majority of these codes appeared in the TGT 
block but a few appeared in the CMD block. Most denials (67% of those reported) are 
attributable to three reasons: The target NLT time cannot be met, the target is not high 
value, or the target is out of range. 
DATE OLD NHVIRNGI RUT RTEi ENAI NDEi FRDI RTGl INT I TlWl RFAIACA 
5 14 i 3 '  4 1  ' 1  
- _  6 1 5 1 7 , 1 2  4 1 5  2 2 ' 3  1 I 1  
7 9 16 121 8 8 3 ' 1 '  ~ 2 '  
TABLE 10 
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5.  PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis of Time Critical Targets (TCT) in FBE G is based primarily on the logged 
LAWS data. Over the interval April 5 through April 11,264 targets were nominated. 
The principal conclusions of this analysis are as follows. 
Only a little over half (56.1 YO) of the nominated targets were fired on. 
For nominations rejected by specific shooters, where the reason for mission denial were 
reported (327 instances), 67% of the denials were limited to three reasons: The target 
NLT time could not be met, the target was not high value, or the target was out of range. 
The median target acquisition to nomination time was 6.5 minutes. The median 
nomination to issuance of the fire when ready command interval was 26 minutes. The 
total acquisition to fire command interval was shorter than that observed in FBE F due 
entirely to a shorter acquisition to nomination time in FBE G. 
For those engagement reporting dwell times (1 36), 57 % satisfied the target NLT time. 
The definition of NLT used in the experiment biased this result in favor of the shooter. 
With one possible exception, there were no successful engagements of targets with dwell 
times of less than 30 minutes. These engagements were considered to have failed 
because the target Not Later Than (NLT) time was not met, the missions were fired 
unmensurated, or both. 
In about 45% of the engagements, the munition employed was TTLAM or TLAM. 
Of the 78 TTLAM missions fired, 27 (35%) were loitering mission. Almost all the 
loitering missions occurred during the interval April 8- 1 1. 
The LAWS data indicate that a low percentage of loitering TTLAMs were retargeted to 
higher priority targets (1 9%). Incompleteness in the LAWS data make this value a lower 
limit. 
For TLAM and non-loitering TTLAM missions, priority 1 and 2 targets were engaged in 
63% of the engagements. 
For ERGM missions there appeared to be no correlation between the number of rounds 
fired and the accuracy with which the target position was mensurated. 
Many of the target nominations were not distributed to all of the shooter nodes, about 
3 1 % of the nominations were sent to only a single shooter node. 
The majority of target nominations with reported dwell times, had dwell times greater 
than the values of 5, 30,60 and 120 minutes that FGE G was intended to focus on. 54 YO 
of 2 16 nominations had dwell times greater than 120 minutes. 
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6. PROBLEMS WITH THE LAWS DATA IN FBE G 
The analysis of the TCT LAWS data was complicated by a number of problems with 
those data. Some of the problems are attributable to the GISRS and/or LAWS operator 











The target acquisition time was not reported in the LAWS Missions Coordination: 
Fires Targeting Information for many target nominations. It was reported in none of 
the nominations identified as originating with LAWS and none of the nominations 
originating with the Anzio and CSG GISRS. 
The acquisitions times for some GISRS nominators are often after the times the 
nominations were received at LAWS. Clocks of all systems need to be synchronized. 
This acquisition time should be reported in GMT. 
The LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires Targeting Information frequently did not 
report an NLT time. 
The LAWS NLT time was calculated with respect to the time the nomination was 
received at LAWS rather than the acquisition time. 
The LAWS Mission Timeline Report was frequently missing events. For example, 
every fired engagement should have reported a fire When Ready (WR) event and a 
Fired Report (FRD). Many fired engagements reported only one of these two events 
and some reported neither. 
The LAWS Mission Timeline Report frequently reported extraneous events. For 
example, many engagements, and some non-engagements, reported a fire On Call 
(OC) event. In Mission Coordination: Fires there is no Fire Mission Status block for 
On Call commands implying this event should not have been reported in this 
experiment. Another example of an erroneous event was the occasionally displayed 
End of Mission event time tagged as 1 Jan. 
The LAWS Mission Timeline Report sometimes contained erroneous time tags. For 
example, the OC, WR and FRD events did not always occur in the correct 
chronological sequence. 
It would be helpful if certain events could be added to the LAWS Mission Timeline 
Report including: time on target, time of receipt of mensuration data, time of route 
request for TTLAM/TLAM missions, time of receipt of route data, and C2 Decision 
time. 
TACAIR missions that appeared in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires mission 
list often did not appear in the LAWS Missions Coordination: TACAIR mission list. 
When they did appear in both lists, the information was often contradictory. For 
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example, in Mission Coordination: Fires the Fired Status (FRD) block would be 
green but in Mission Coordination: TACAIR the FLN block would be yellow or 
white. 
10. TTLAM and TLAM missions that appeared in Mission Coordination: Fires would 
often not appear in Mission Coordination: TLAM. When the missions did appear in 
both lists, the data were sometimes contradictory. For example, the FRD block in 
Mission Coordination: Fires would be green but the Status block in Mission 
Coordination: TLAM could report Launch req. Conversely, there were cases where 
the Status block in Mission Coordination: TLAM would report Fired but the FRD 
block in Mission Coordination: Fires would be white. 
1 1. In Mission Coordination: TLAM a loitering TTLAM should exhibit in the Mission 
Data: a default target position, a loiter box aimpoint and, if applicable, a retargeting 
aimpoint. In many cases, the default and loitering aimpoints were identical. It 
appears that the operators were not adequately trained, or constrained by the LAWS 
software, in setting up loitering TTLAM missions. 
12. The LAWS approval and status blocks do not have a protocol for dealing with 
loitering TTL AMs. 
13. LAWS has a data export function that has the potential for being of great help in the 
analysis and archiving of data. It would be very useful if all LAWS data, in particular 
all of the Timeline events, were included among the data elements that the export 
function provides. 
14. There are a number of cases where the final color state of the various LAWS blocks 
do not correspond to a logical pattern. In the examples listed below, the color of the 
LAWS element approvals, fire mission status and fired status blocks is indicated by 
the name of the block, an equal sign, and the first letter of the color. 
a. LG 0029 (April 8). CSG TTLAM. TGT=CMD=FRD=G. W = R  and displays 
RTG. 
b. GA1037 (April 8) Anzio ERGM firing. TGT=WRD=FRD=G, but CMD=W. 
c. GJ0009 (April 7) Anzio LASM firing. TGT=G, CMD=Y, W = W ,  FRD=G. 
15. CE and LE were not consistently reported in the same units. In a few cases, the CE 
and LE accuracy entered in the remarks were specified in feet or meters. In the great 
majority of cases, the units were not specified. 
16. In a few instances, Mission Coordination: Fires displayed inadmissible weapon target 
combinations, e.g. CTF67/ERGM7 CVWITTLAM. 
17. TGT and CMD missions denials (i.e. red approval blocks) were often not 
accompanied by a denial code. 
ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVE DATA FBE H 
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1. Principal Findings. 
This section lists the principal findings gleaned from an analysis of the FBE H objective 
data. The findings are divided into three groups, the groups are: 
Operational. Findings related to participant actions. 
Experimental Methodology. Findings related to the way the experiment was designed and 
the way the experimental procedures were defined. 
Process. Findings related to the experiment system architecture and its operation. 
1.1. Operational Findings. 
Sixty-three percent of TST target nominations were engaged. This result is similar to that 
in FBE F and FBE G. 
A plurality of targets were engaged with LASM (46 percent). 
The San Jacinto conducted 79 percent of all engagements. 
A high percent of missions (including both TST and MTO) called for engagements with 
multiple rounds (45 percent) but in only three cases were the rounds given individual aim 
points. Of the eight LASM missions that called for multiple rounds, only three cases 
fired the required number of rounds. 
A large fraction of TST missions (30 percent) were fired unmensurated. 
For GISRC the median interval from target acquisition to transmission of the target 
nomination to LAWS and JTW was 5.1 minutes (mean time was 8.6 minutes). 
For JTW the median interval between receipt of the mensuration request and transmission 
of the mensuration target position was 4.5 minutes (mean time was 7.9 minutes). 
For LAWS the median interval between receipt of the target nomination at LAWS until 
the issuance of the fire when ready command was 14.5 minutes (mean time was 22.6 
minutes). 
For RPM the median time from receipt of a TLAM or TTLAM route request until 
transmission of the completed route for a TST target was 80 seconds (mean 79.9seconds). 
Few, if any, targets with dwell times of 30 minutes or less were successfully engaged. 
BDA data, as manually entered into the DTF, were often inconsistent with the LAWS 
engagement information. 
1.2 Experiment Methodology Findings 
The rate of target nomination, determined from the nominations that appear in LAWS, 
was low (24.8/day including both MTO and TST nominations). But there is evidence 
that a significant number of nominations did not reach LAWS (see Section 1.2). 
Calculated target Not Later Than (NLT) times are often not realistic. NLT times need to 
be determined based on the knowledge of the state of individual targets. 
The San Jacinto engaged 48 percent of its MTO targets. MTO targets were often 
furnished with no or erroneous and unmensurated target positions. The MTO 
engagements were fired unmensurated. There was no interaction between the MTO and 
TST tasking. 
1.3 Process Findings 
Of those nominations logged as sent by GISRC, 30 percent do not appear in LAWS. Of 
those nominations logged by JTW, 44 percent do not appear in LAWS. There were five 
instances where JTW reported a target mensurated but the mensurated data do not appear 
in LAWS. A mechanism to verify the receipt of nominations and other messages within 
the DFN is required. 
For RPM the median time from receipt of a TLAM or TTLAM route request until 
transmission of the completed route for MTO missions was median 177.5 seconds with a 
mean of 32 1.5 seconds. The corresponding figures for TST targets were 80 and 79.9 
seconds. The MTO mission times were much higher because of the near simultaneous 
request for many TTLAM routes resulting in the queuing of requests, route requests 
remained in the queue for a maximum of 960 seconds. A single RPM workstation is 
inadequate for high engagement intensity. 
The great majority of weapon firings (at least 77 percent of the engagements) were not 
sent to, and not fired, flown out, or impacted in JSAF. This had a significant impact on 
the engagement timeline and utilization of assets due to the delay in target assessment 
and BDA. 
Despite an effort to introduce time synchronization to FBE H there is evidence 
synchronization was not achieved. This synchronization is necessary to characterize 
DFN latencies and construct engagement timelines 
Latencies in the transmission of: nominations to LAWS and JTW, UAVSim video to 
GISRC and updates among the LAWS nodes, at times, significantly affected engagement 
timelines. 
DTFs do not log the time and source of each update. The DTFs do not contain target 
engagement data (e.g. weapon employed, time of fire, time of impact). 
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2. TST Engagements 
In FBE F and G the missions that appeared in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires 
display were limited to TST missions. In FBE H, the LAWS data included some MTO 
targets in addition to the TST targets. In many cases, a target was identified as an MTO 
target in the LAWS remarks, in other cases the MTO nature of the target was deduced 
from the fact it was nominated by the San Jacinto LAWS workstation rather than a 
GISRC work station. The following discussion refers only to the TST targets unless 
otherwise stated. 
Table1 summarizes the engagement data for TSTs in Phase I of FBE H. The nomination 
rate in FBE H was low with an average of 19 nominations per day (including the MTO 
nominations the value goes up to 24.8 nominations per day) compared to 40.6 
nominations per day in FBE G. Of the 76 TST targets nominated, 48 (63%) were 
engaged. The engagement rate in FBE H is similar to that in FBE F (53%) and FBE G 
(56%). 
The nominations examined are those that appear in the LAWS Mission Coordination: 
Fires display. As will be discussed later (see Sections 5.2 and 7.1), there is evidence that 
many nominations do not appear in LAWS. A small number of nominations that were 
described as test cases or inadvertent duplicates have been excluded from the analysis. 
The breakdown of weapon types assigned to the TST engagements are listed below: 
LASM 45.9% FASM 2.1% 
ERGM 3 1.3% TACAIR 2.1% 
TTLAM 18.8% 
The choice of weapons shifted dramatically with respect to FBE G. In particular, the 
TST targets against which TTLAM/TLAM were employed dropped from 44.9 % in FBE 
G to 18.8 % in FBE H. In FBE G, LASM was employed against 15.1% of the TSTs 
while in FBE H the corresponding figure is 45.9%. The differences in employment 
extend beyond these numbers. In FBE G many of the TTLAMs were fired into loiter 
boxes (35%), in FBE H, however, only TTLAM one targeted to a loiter box. In FBE H, 
a11 LASM missions specified a single missile, In FBE H eight of the 21 (38%) LASM 
TST missions fired called for multiple projectiles. 
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iis is not a round count, In many missions multiple rounds werefired. 
TABLE 1 
FBE H TST ENGAGEMENT DATA 
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3. Nominated Targets not Engaged. 
For the 28 TST nominations not engaged in FBE H, the LAWS denial codes, or remarks 
in the LAWS Targeting Information, provided reasons for the target rejection in eight 
cases (see Table 2). The remarks, in LAWS, indicate the INT rejection code was used in 
cases where mensuration data were not available. In three other cases, not included in the 
table, the INT and OLD rejection codes were applied to indicate inadvertent duplicate 
nominations. A consistent and standardized definition and application of LAWS denial 
codes is needed. 
TABLE 2 
REASONS MISSION WERE NOT FIRED AS INDICATED IN LAWS 
LAWS CODE REASON FOR NOT # OF CASES 
ENGAGING TARGET 
INT Past Intel cutoff date 3 
OLD Target dwell time exceeded 1 
TGM Target Moving 2 
NHV Not High Value 1 
No hit Area 1 
4. Multiple Round Missions. 
In many FBE H engagements it was specified in the LAWS Firing Information that more 
than a single round was to be fired against a target. Table 3 gives the fraction of multiple 
round missions by weapon type. The data in the table includes both the MTO and TST 
missions that were fired and appear in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires display. 
Table 3 includes 48 TST missions and 11 MTO missions. All the multiple round 
TTLAM/TLAM missions are MTO missions. 
TABLE 3 
FRACTION OF FIRED MISSIONS CALLING FOR MORE THAN ONE ROUND 
WEAPON #MISSIONS # WITH>I RND % 
TTLAM/TLAM 18 3 16.7 
LASM 24 8 33.3 
ERGM 15 14 93.3 
FASM 2 1 50 
4.1 Rounds Actually Fired 
The LASM data are in particular illustrative of inconsistency in mission execution. Of the 
eight missions in which more than one round was required, there were only three cases 
where the requested number of rounds were fired. 
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In two cases, the requested LASMs were replaced, at least in part, by TTLAMs. For 
target number GM5032, three LASMs were specified but one LASM and one TTLAM 
were fired. For target number GM503 1 a single LASM round was requested but a single 
TTLAM round was fired. This latter mission is counted as a TTLAM mission not a 
LASM mission. 
There were also cases (GSOOS 1 and GS0084) where more than the requested number of 
projectiles were fired. These could be execution errors but, more likely, represent 
reengagement of targets using the same target number (see Section 4.3). 
4.2 Aim Points 
For all the cases in which multiple rounds were fired (14 ERGM, 6 LASM, 3 
TTLAM/TLAM and 1 FASM), in only three cases were different aim points used for the 
individual projectiles: 
For target number GS0038 (an MTO target), three TTLAMs were fired at the same 
aimpoint one at a different aimpoint. 
For target number GS0040 (an MTO target), all four TTLAMs were fired at different 
aimpoints. 
For the GS0081 TST mission, only one LASM round was requested but 2 TTLAMs and 
one LASM were fired, two at one aimpoint the third round at a different aimpoint. 
4.3 Multiple Rounds Engagements Result in Missing LAWS Data 
LAWS permits target reengagement using the same target number, but the LAWS 
Mission Coordination: Fires timeline reports timeline events for only one of the 
projectiles. For LASM, TLAM and TTLAM firings the individual launches are listed in 
the Mission Coordination: TLAM table but the times of the individual launches are not 
reported. This may not be a serious problem where multiple rounds are requested and 
they are fired virtually simultaneously. It is a problem when the mission is refired after a 
long interval. The Missions Coordination: Fires timeline records data for only one of the 
firings and data for the other is essentially lost. It is proposed that a unique target number 
be created for each distinct weapon firing at a target. For example, if a LASM is fired at 
target number GS4444, which is subsequently engaged with a TTLAM, the TTLAM 




When mensuration data are received at LAWS, the Circular Error (CE) and Linear Error 
(LE) values are automatically recorded in the remarks area of the targeting information. 
In the case of the San Jacinto, the JTW- LAWS communication link was not functioning, 
therefore, the mensuration data were not transmitted in an ATI.ATR message to LAWS. 
Consequently, the LAWS operator manually entered mensurated coordinates and the 
CE/LE data. The absence of CE/LE values in the LAWS Targeting Information is taken 
as evidence that the target was unmensurated. Unmensurated TST missions include the 
following: 
Of the 22 LASM missions 6 (27.3%) were fired unmensurated. 
Of the 15 ERGM mission 5 (33.3%) were fired unmensurated. 
Of the 9 TTLAM missions 3 (33.3%) were fired unmensurated. 
Firing of TTLAMs at unmensurated targets does not necessarily represent a procedural 
failure in that the mensurated target position can be transmitted to the in-flight missile. 
But in FBE H, only one TTLAM was retargeted and it was not one of the unmensurated 
launches. 
The great majority (82 percent) of the unmensurated firings for LASM and ERGM 
occurred on 3 1 August. 
For two of the unmensurated nominations, the JTW data log sheets (see 5.1) confirm that 
target mensuration was not performed due to the lack of Digital Point Positioning 
Database (DPPDB) data. 
5.1 JTW Data. 
JTW data were successfully collected only on the MTW and HST. Mensuration was 
performed on 36 (72%) of the 50 nominations received by those two platforms. The JTW 
data were not automatically logged. The operator manually recorded the time the request 
was received from GISRC, the time the mensurated data were sent to LAWS and the 
actual time spent mensurating the target. In most cases where the target could not be 
mensurated, it was because there were no DPPDB data for the target area (this occurred 
for 10 nominations). Table 4 contains summary data compiled from JTW data sheets 
supplied by Bruce Butts (NRO). For the two platforms that supplied mensuration data, 
the average mensuration time from the receipt of mensuration request until the data were 
transmitted was 7.9 minutes similar to the average of about nine minutes in FBE G. As 
Table 4 shows, the average mensuration time for the MTW was 6.3 minutes with zero 
time in queue. But for the HST, even on days with few requests, there were significant 
delays in the queue (average mensuration time 3.9 minutes, average receipt to send time 
8.4 minutes). The FBE H mensuration time average was somewhat reduced due to fact 
that on Aug 3 1 the HST JTW mensurated 10 targets fiom a single UAV image. The 
effect of that unusual circumstance on mensuration time is obvious in the August 3 1 HST 
data in Table 4. 
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Figure 1 is a histogram of the intervals measured from the receipt of the mensuration 
request until the transmission of the mensurated target position. 
TABLE 4 
JTW DATA 
RECEIPT TO SEND IMENSURATION TIME 
PLATFORM I DATE #REQUEST #MENSURATEDi AVG MEDIAN AVG I MEDIAN 
MTW ' 28 4 1  2 ] 105 ~ 1 0 5  105 1 10.5 
MTW 2 9 1  3 1 0 I 
MTW , 3 0 1  0 0 I 
MTW 1 3 1 ' 7  5 4.6 4 4.6 4 
MTW I ALL 14 7 629 I 5 6.29 5 
HST 1 28 1 6 5* 14 14 1 10 I 10 
HST 1 29 6 3 33 1 16 ~ 8 7 
7 I 5.3 I 5 
HST I 31 20 1 
HST ALL 1 36 26 4 3.9 3 
~ 7 9  I 4 5  4.4 I 4 
I 
MTW,HST I ALL 50 33 
I I 
' 2.3 I 2 5  
3 7 
18 I 3 7  3 
HST 1 30 4 
I ~ 8 4  
I I 1 I I 
I 
*three of the mensurations were interrupted by briefings and are not included in the totals I 
FIGURE 1 
HISTOGRAM OF JTW RECEIPT OF NOMINATION TO COMPLETION INTERVAL 
( 3 3  observations) 
<=I 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 >I0 
TIME (min.) 
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5.2 Missing Nominations 
A comparison of the 50 target nominations received by the JTWs on the MTW and HST 
with the target nominations reported in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires display 
shows that 22 (44%) of the JTW nominations did not appear in LAWS. Further, there 
were five cases where the JTW logs state the target was mensurated but the CE/LE values 
indicative of a mensurated target were not reported in LAWS implying the updated 
ATI.ATR message sent from a JTW were not received at LAWS. There is at present no 
mechanism to verify the receipt of ATI.ATR messages sent between GISRC, LAWS and 
JTW. Such a mechanism is required. Missing nominations are discussed further in 
Section 7. 
6. Acquisition - LAWS Interval. 
GISRC defines the acquisition time as the time that the GISRC operator creates a track 
(or updates an existing track) of a militarily significant object. GISRC automatically 
records and logs this event. This acquisition time is included in the ATI.ATR nomination 
to LAWS and is reported in the LAWS Targeting Information. In FBE H, changes to the 
GISRC software ensured the inclusion of the acquisition time in the ATLATR message, 
an improvement from FBE G. 
Despite the attempted introduction of time synchronization for all systems for FBE H, 
timing problems persist. With regard to the interval between Acquisition and receipt of 
the nomination at LAWS (hereafter LAWS-ACQ) these timing problems were 
manifested in two ways: 
1. For most of Phase I of FBE H (Aug 28-3 l), the LAWS-ACQ interval for the GM and 
GC nominators (GISRC MTW and Cherry Point) averages about four minutes which 
is consistent with time estimates of GISRC operators. The LAWS-ACQ interval for 
the GS and GH nominators (GISRC San Jacinto and HST) averages about one hour 
and four minutes. It is possible that the LAWS workstations on the HST and the San 
Jacinto were reset to local time for a more easterly time zone. 
2. For the last part of the day on Aug 3 1 the LAWS-ACQ interval for several GH 
nominations was about 58 minutes (given the above assumption, this implies the 
LAWS-ACQ interval is negative for these engagements) and the interval for one 
nomination from GC was -9 minutes. This suggests LAWS and GISRC were out of 
synchronization by roughly 10 minutes. 
Accordingly, in determining the values for the ACQ-LAWS interval 60 minutes was 
subtracted from the values for GS and GH nominations and data subsequent to the 
GH0225 nomination on August 3 1 were discarded. 
For 60 TST nominations (excluding data subsequent to nomination GH0225 on Aug 3 1 
and two outliers where the interval was greater than one hour) the mean time between 
acquisition and receipt of the nomination at LAWS was 5.15 minutes with a median time 
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of four minutes. In the LAWS data, the acquire time is reported in minutes, time of 
receipt at LAWS is reported to the second but that time has been rounded to the nearest 
minute. Table 5 below compares the data from the last three FBEs. 
EXPERIMENT #OBSERVATIONS 
FBE H 60 






FBE F I30 I 27.3 I 23 
Even though the total number of nominations in FBE H was much smaller than in FBE 
G, the sample size presented in the table is larger because of the changes made to GISRC 
to ensure acquire time was recorded for every GISRC initiated nomination. 
As will be discussed in Section 7, the event data from GISRC, available for the first time 
in this experiment, provided evidence that the ACQ- LAWS interval determined as 
above, is subject to a timing error. Nevertheless, the calculation was performed to provide 
a direct comparison with the data from previous experiments. 
7. GISRC Data 
Each GISRC workstation (San Jacinto, MTW, HST and Cherry Point) logged 
information for each target acquired and nominated. The GISRC data were supplied by 
Jim Burdell and Greg Bulla (SPAWAR). The GISRC data are not complete, particularly 
early in the experiment when the data logging program was being modified. The logged 
GISRC data contain 37 instances where nominations were sent to LAWS compared to the 
76 TST nominations that LAWS actually received. 
For this analysis, the first TOT time (= acquisition time), nomination time and the time 
nomination was sent were used to compute the interval between acquisition and 
nomination (ACQ-NOM), the interval between nomination and the time the nomination 
was sent to LAWS (NOM - SEND) and the total interval between acquisition and 
sending the nomination (ACQ - SEND). As Table 6 indicates, the GISRC processing 
time is predominately involved with the mechanics of preparing the nomination message 
and selecting and appending imagery to it (i.e. the NOM-SEND interval). Because the 
data contain outliers the median values are considered more representative. 
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TABLE 6 
GISRC TIME INTERVALS 
(times in seconds) 
ACQ-NOM NOM-SEND ACQ-SEND 
# OBSERVATIONS 41 35 36 
MEAN 162.98 384.14 515.56 
MEDIAN 10 248 305.5 
The GISRC median ACQ-SEND interval of five minutes (305.5 secs) should be 
compared to the value reported in Table 5 which shows the median interval between 
GISRC acquisition and receipt of the nomination at LAWS was four minutes. The two 
populations of nominations used to determine these medians are not identical so the 
values are not directly comparable, but it would be expected that if anything, the latter 
interval would be longer. Construction of time lines for several engagements showed 
cases for which the time that GISRC reported the nomination was sent to LAWS was 
about 50 seconds after the time that LAWS reported the nomination was received (one of 
these timelines in shown in Table 11). This appears to be another manifestation of 
unsynchronized clocks on different systems. 
Figure 2 presents a histogram of the ACQ-SEND interval for 36 GISRC nominations. 
Of the 37 cases where GISRC logged a nomination sent time (one reported an erroneous 
time and is not included in Table 6 or Figure 2), 11 were apparently not received by 
LAWS in that they do not appear in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires list. Again, a 
mechanism for confirming receipt of, and for re-sending nominations is required. 
FIGURE 2 
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8. LAWS - Fire Interval. 
The LAWS timeline events relating to weapon firing are frequently missing and 
occasionally obviously erroneous. The transmit On call (XMT OC), and transmit when 
ready (XMT WR) fire commands and the Fired Report (FRD) randomly appear or are 
absent for the fired engagements. This was also in the case in FBE F and FBE G. Table 7 
provides the statistics on the FBE H fire times in comparison with the data collected in 
FBE F and FBE G. The data from FBE H are distinguished by the small sample size and 




INTERVALS FROM LAWS RECEIPT OF NOMINATION TO FIRE RELATED 
EVENTS 
oc WR FRD 
EXP #OBS AVG MED #OBS AVG MED #OBS AVG MED 
FBEH 10 22.3 20.5 16 22.6 14.5 11 44 48 
FBEG 90 19.5 14.5 30 27 26 52 41.1 37 
I I I I I I 
FBEF INA I 40 I 21.2 I16 116 I 38.8 1 39 
The events in the table are: 
OC: Issuance of On Call fire command. 
WR: Issuance of When Ready fire command. 
FRD: receipt of Fired report. 
Average (AVG) and Median (MED) times are in minutes. 
The statistics reported for FBE G and FBE F exclude outlying observations where the 
intervals exceeded 90 minutes. The intervals between the receipt of the nomination at 
LAWS and the various fire related events shows no substantial change over the three 
experiments. 
Figure 3 is a histogram of the LAWS the intervals between the receipt of the target 
nomination at LAWS and the issuance of the fire when ready command. 
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FIGURE 3 
HISTOGRAM OF THE LAWS RECEIPT OF NOMINATION TO THE FIRE 
COMMAND (WHEN READY) INTERVAL 
(1 6 Observations) 
<=2 2-4 4-6 6-8 8-10 10.12 12-14 14-76 16-18 18-20 20-22 >20 
TIME (min.) 
9. Dwell Times. 
A table of target dwell times for use in FBE H was created by Jim Burdell (SPAWAR). 
On nominating a target, the GISRC operator selected a target type and the dwell time for 
that target type was automatically entered into the LAWS nomination message. LAWS 
does not report the dwell time, but computes and reports a NLT time that is based on the 
dwell time. In this analysis, the dwell times were recovered from the reported LAWS 
NLT times by taking the difference between the NLT time and the time the nomination 
was received at LAWS. In general, these computed dwell times corresponded with the 
tabular dwell times, for the appropriate target types, as contained in the dwell time table. 
However, particularly in the first days of the experiment, it appears some of the GISRC 
operators were manually inserting erroneous dwell times. In’ particular, SCUD dwell 
times were correctly found to be 30 min. for August 30 and 3 1 but on August 28 and 29 
they varied from 9 min. to 2 hrs. For these latter two days the GM nominator reported 
the correct value, but the GS and GH nominators did not. 
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10. Definition of NLT Time 
As described in Section 9, LAWS calculates the NLT time by adding the dwell time to 
the time the nomination was received at LAWS. This NLT value is an optimistic 
estimate from the perspective of the shooter, in the sense that he will be led to believe 
the target will be engageable longer than it in fact would. Often, a better approximation 
to the NLT time would be obtained by adding the dwell time to the GISRC reported 
acquisition time. However, in those cases where the target is observed to stop and the 
nomination then updated, the current NLT definition is appropriate. The treatment of 
dwell and NLT times should be reexamined and adapted to reflect the knowledge and 
status of specific targets. 
A separate issue is the play of dwell times in JSAF. JSAF has the capability of 
automatically moving or hiding a TST after the expiration of its dwell time. It should be 
ensured that this feature of JSAF is employed so that if projectiles are impacting after the 
expiration of a target’s dwell time and its consequent movement out of the projectile 
impact area, they are not being credited with a kill. 
10.1 Meeting NLT Times 
Table 8 displays the engagement NLT status as a function of dwell time. That is, was the 
target hit within the dwell time (NLT met), was the target not hit within the dwell time 
(NLT not met) or is the result uncertain (NLT met?). The latter category was applied to 
TLAM or TTLAM launches for which the interval between the LAWS fire event and 
the NLT time was less than 30 minutes or ERGM and LASM launches for which that 
interval was less than 10 minutes. The uncertainty in the actual fire time and the 
projectile time of flight means it is uncertain whether the projectile would have struck the 
target before expiration of the dwell time. The LAWS Mission Timeline Report may 
report three fire related events: transmission of the On Call (OC) fire command, 
transmission of the When Ready (WR) fire command, and the Fired Report (FRD). 
Whether these data are present or not for a fired mission is unpredictable. In the case of 
FBE H, there are many cases where the Mission Coordination: Fires and the Mission 
Coordination: TLAM displays indicate the missions were fired but the corresponding 
Mission Timeline Reports contain none of the fire related events. This circumstance is 
reflected in the “unknown” NLT status. As Table 8 indicates, all those engagements 
where the NLT time was unequivocally not met were for dwell times of 30 minutes or 
less. Table 9 contains details of the 11 fired engagements with dwell times 30 minutes 
or less for which there was some information related to the mission fire time. This table 
reports the CE/LE accuracy of the mensuration as reported in LAWS. A value of O/O, 
100/100 or a blank indicates that the target was unmensurated. As the table shows, the 
only two cases (GS0091, GC0067) where the dwell times were 30 minutes or less in 
which the targets were judged to have been hit within their dwell times, appear to have 
been fired unmensurated. GC0067 was an ERGM mission and the firing of five ERGMs 
may represent an attempt to compensate for the absence of mensuration. But all five 
ERGMs were targeted at the same aim point. 
TABLE 8 
ENGAGEMENT NLT STATUS AS A FUNCTION OF DWELL TIME 
I 
IDWELL 'NLT met /NLT met? 'NLT not met (Unknown Not fired ITotals 
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TABLE 9 
ALL FIRED ENGAGEMENTS WITH DWELL <= 30 MINUTES AND A LAWS 
REPORTED FIRE TIME 
I 6.1E.5 I l ( 4 )  28(69) N 
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11. FWM Data. 
A single RPM workstation located in JTASC generated routes for all the TLAM and 
TTLAM missions. The RPM workstation automatically logged the time a route request 
was received and placed in a queue, the time route processing was initiated, the time it 
was completed and the time the completed route was transmitted to LAWS. The raw 
RPM data, provided by Michael Weissenberger (Boeing), have been analyzed and the 
results are presented in the Table 10. 
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TABLE 10 
NUMBER OF MISSIONS 
NUMBER OF ROUTES 
MEAN TIME IN QUEUE 
MEDIAN TIME IN QUEUE 
MEAN TIME TO COMPUTE ROUTE 
MEDIAN TIME TO COMPUTE ROUTE 
MEAN TIME -RECEIPT OF REQUEST TO TRANSMIT ROUTE 
MEDIAN TIME - RECEIPT OF REQUEST TO TRANSMIT ROUTE 
RPM ROUTE GENERATION TIMES FOR MTO AND TST TARGETS 
(times in seconds) 







32 1.5 79.9 
177.5 80 
I MISSIONTYPE I 
The mean time required to compute a route for both MTO and TST missions was 83.6 
seconds. The dispersion was small as indicated by the minimum and maximum intervals 
were respectively 65 and 1 15 seconds. The total time required to process a mission was 
predominately determined by the time the route request had to wait for processing in the 
queue. This in queue interval reached as high as 960 seconds. This large value occurred 
on 28 August when three MTO missions, each requiring four TLAMs to be fired, were 
processed. The RPM work load was exacerbated by requests for extraneous routes. The 
C4IGW operator reported (LAWS IRC channel August 28, 10:02) that “RPM is getting 
MPRs for the same routes multiple times”. As an example, MTO mission GS0038 
consisted of four TLAM firings but RPM generated nine TTLAM routes. Thus, least a 
portion of the RPM workload was spurious. Nevertheless, it appears it is not difficult to 
overload, a single RPM workstation, capable only of sequential mission processing and, 
consequently, significantly extend engagement timelines. In a few cases (all Deyo or 
Ale engagements on Aug. 3 l), there were no routes generated for TLAM engagements. 
12. Digital target Folders (DTF) 
The function of the DTFs are to serve as a repository of all information relating to TSTs. 
In FBE H the DTFs received input from the following sources: 
GISRC ATI.ATR 
JTW ATI.ATR 
BDA Manual input 
CAST creates link to preexisting target data. 
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12.1. TST DTFs 
In FBE H, 128 TST DTFs were created. Deleting those DTFs created prior to the start of 
the experiment (31), a total of 96 DTFs were created during Phase I of FBE H. This 
number includes the MTO targets nominated by the San Jacinto GISRC (4) and 
duplicate DTFs (1 6).  Excluding those, there are DTFs for 82 nominated targets. This is 
very similar to the number of targets nominated in LAWS, but the targets in the two lists 
do not closely correspond. There are 46 target numbers in LAWS that do not appear in 
the DTFs and there are 21 target numbers in the DTFs that do not appear in LAWS. The 
latter figure further conforms the evidence of GISRC and JTW that not all nominated 
targets appear in LAWS. 
12.1.1. Mensuration data 
The DTF was to be automatically updated with the ATI.ATR message that JTW sent to 
LAWS and the DTF with the mensurated target coordinates. This did not appear to work 
reliably in that only 13 of the DTFs reported Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) data. 
12.1.2. BDA Data 
BDA was manually inserted into the DTF by setting the Target Status field. There were 
four states displayed in this field: Active, under engagement, attack completed, and 
destroyed. For the 82 FBE H Phase I DTFs, the number of DTFs reporting each of the 
four BDA states is shown in Table 1 1. 
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A comparison of specific nominations from LAWS and the DTFs indicates that the DTF 
Target Status is often not consistent with the LAWS engagement data. For example, in 
the LAWS data for 28 August there are six nominations which were not engaged but are 
listed as destroyed in the DTFs (GS0055, GM5020, GS0043, GS0044, GS0054, 
GS0037). 
12.1.3 Data Time Tags 
The DTF records the time the folder was created and the time of the last update. The 
DTF would be more valuable if each data element entered into the table were time 
tagged. In particular, the DMPI data format provides a field named Time Mensurated but 
it was never filled. 
12.1.4 Additional Data 
The DTF is advertised as the repository of all relevant targeting data but there are many 
important gaps. There needs to be engagement data including: firing platform, weapon, 
time of fire, and impact time. Much more detail is required for BDA including time of 
BDA, source of BDA, and BDA sensor. 
12.1.5 DTF Utility 
The DTF folder was little used by FBE participants as a tool in the TST engagement 
process. This was in large part due to the inconvenience in accessing the DTF site for 
busy operators. Lack of DTF use presumably also owes something to the DTF data 
deficiencies described above. 
12.2 Deliberate Target DTF 
There were 289 DTFs for deliberate targets. After creation, these DTFs were never 
updated. They contain no BDA or mensuration data. 
13. JSAF Data 
In FBE H, none of the fire events for ERGM, LASM or TLAM for non virtual ships (e.g. 
San Jacinto and Deyo) were sent to JSAF. The San Jacinto and Deyo used ERGMs and 
LASMs to engage 77 percent of the TST targets. Accordingly, the great majority of TST 
weapons were not fired, flown out, or assessed in JSAF. The impact of this on the 
engagement timeline and, in particular, BDA is illustrated in Section 15. 
14. MTO Missions 
In FBE H, the LAWS Missions Coordination: Fires list contains some MTO missions in 
addition to the TST missions. The MTO missions, all assigned to the San Jacinto, were 
identifiable particularly on August 30 and 31 by remarks appearing in the LAWS 
Targeting Information identifying them as MTO targets. The other MTO targets were 
identified on the basis of the nominator (usually the San Jacinto LAWS) and the 
correspondence of the target location in the MTO with the target location reported in the 
LAWS Targeting Information. 
Between August 28 and 3 1 , 23 MTO engagements were assigned to the San Jacinto. Of 
those, 19 were nominated to LAWS by the San Jacinto LAWS or GISRC operators. 
Those that were not nominated lacked target positions in the MTO. Of the I9 targets 
nominated 11 were fired on. The reasons for engagement denial were listed in LAWS for 
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six of the eight targets that were not engaged, they included 4 RNG (range), 1 INT 
(intelligence), and 1 TIW (target in water). Other remarks in LAWS indicated the target 
positions were erroneous for the INT, TIW and one of the RNG missions. The MTO 
targets were not mensurated, this is explicitly stated in the LAWS remarks for some of 
the MTO targets (e.g. GS0038, GS0039, GS0040). Lack of mensuration is also indicated 
by the fact that the MTO target coordinates were almost always reported with zero 
seconds. 
Operationally, the San Jacinto would fire its few MTO missions (from one to four) the 
first thing each day and then spend the rest of the day on TST targets. There was no 
interaction between the MTO and TST processes. 
15. Data Latency 
On August 3 1 Richard Tanner (INRI) made manual measurements of the interval it took 
for a track entered at the MTW or HST to appear on GCCS-M or C2PC displays at 
JTASC and vise versa. Fourteen observations produced intervals ranging from I .8 to 9 
seconds with mean and median of 3.9 and three seconds respectively. Although 
quantitative measurements were not made for other data latencies, a number of reports 
indicate that, at times, significant latencies existed for UAVSim video transmitted to 
GISRC and for communication of LAWS updates between the LAWS workstations. In 
constructing timelines for several engagements, in two cases (GH0209 and GH0210) it 
was found that it took more than 50 minutes for the nominations to reach LAWS and 
JTW from GISRC. Characterizing the magnitude and frequency of significant latencies 
in communications between systems in the DFN requires more complete electronic data 
capture by the various DFN systems and accurate time synchronization of those systems. 
16. A Timeline Example 
Table 12 presents a timeline for the engagement of target GM5032. This engagement 
timeline is comparatively complete and demonstrates the information potential of 
timelines. It also illustrates some of the problems the available data present in the 
construction of a complete and accurate timeline. 
This mission was fired by the San Jacinto on August 3 1. The mission is listed in the 
LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires display as a LASM mission but the target was first 
engaged with a TTLAM and subsequently a LASM. Both weapons were fired under the 
same target number. LAWS does not retain timeline data for multiple weapons fired with 
the same target number. Both the TTLAM and LASM firings are reported in the LAWS 
Mission Coordination: TLAM display but, unfortunately, the fire times were not reported 
there. 
The LAWS data indicate the target was mensurated but the JTW data were not collected 
on the San Jacinto and the San Jacinto JTW was not able to transmit ATI.ATR messages 
to the San Jacinto LAWS, accordingly, JTW timeline information is missing. 
The timeline exhibits the following inconsistencies and problems: 
1. The LAWS Timeline Report indicates the nomination was received at LAWS 45 
seconds before GISRC reported it sent. 
2. The San Jacinto LAWS smtp-out log indicates the Mission Planning Request (MPR) 
was sent to the RPM 139 seconds after it was received, as logged by the RPM, and 60 
seconds after the San Jacinto LAWS smtp-in log indicates the completed route was 
received from RPM. 
3. The RPM log indicates the route data were transmitted one second after they were 
received according to the San Jacinto LAWS smtp-in log. 
4. The LAWS Timeline Fired Report for the LASM is time tagged about 20 minutes after 
the time of launch as indicated by the information in the San Jacinto observer log and 
IRC GISRC channel. 
5. IRC and San Jacinto observer logs indicate the LASM was fired prior to 1400. TOF 
would only have been a few minutes but BDA did not occur until 143 1. The need to 
manually impose target assessment and BDA (because the LASM firing was not sent to 
JSAF) required the UAV loitering in the target vicinity for about 30 minutes after the 
actual impact time. 
The excerpts from the IRC GISRC channel that appear in Table 12, relate to the tasking 
of a UAV to obtain BDA for GM5032. The GISRC channel communications do not refer 
to a target number, only the target coordinates, accordingly the relevance of these data is 
circumstantial but they appear consistent with the timeline events. 
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j TIME (hhmmss) 1 EVENTIREPORT 1 SOURCE 
130005 IACQUIRE 'MTW GISRC LOG 
130027 I NOMINATE MTW GISRC LOG 
130738 ,SEND MTW GISRC LOG I 
TABLE 12 
ENGAGEMENT TIMELINE FOR TARGET GM5032 
130653 i RECEIVED BY LAWS LAWS TIMELINE I 
133323 'STARTED TO CREATE ROUTE RPM LOG I 
133322 MPR RECEIVED BY RPM 'RPM LOG I 1 I 
133441 
133442 ITRANSMllTED ROUTE TO LAWS RPM LOG 
133445 XMT OC FIRE COMMAND LAWS TIMELINE 
133541 (MPR TO RPM SAN JAC LAWS SMTP-OUT LOG 
133833 1 
1339XX TLAM AWAY, TOF 10 MINS 1IRC LAWS CHANNEL I 
1346XX ITLAM IMPACT, AWAIT BDA llRC LAWS CHANNEL I 
I I 
I 




133730 ITLAM ROUTE TO JSAF I MTW LAWS SMTP-OUT LOG 1 
INDIGO FIRING REPORT TO JSAF MTW LAWS SMTP-OUT LOG 
1338XX FIRE TLAM, TOF 10 MINS. , SAN JAC OBSERVER LOG I 
135142 BDA= NO EFFECT, REENGAGE I LAWS COMMO LOG I 
1351XX RETARGET, FIRE LASM I SAN JAC OBSERVER LOG I 
141628 FIRED REPORT 1 LAWS TIMELINE 
1431XX TARGET DESTROYED I IRC GISRC CHANNEL I 
I 
TIME (hhmm) i IRC GISRC CHANNEL COMMUNlCdTlONS (GM5032) I I 
(LAWS coordinates for GM5032 are 34 33 57.7N, 77 16 38.7 W) I 
I 
I 
1329 i<MTW_GISR2> #5, please investigate 34 39 56N1077 20 38W, possible movementlstaging area 
1326 I<MTW GISR2> #5. what do vou have? I - 
1338 
1338 
1<UAV-5-62 MTW-GISR, traffic in vicinity of 34 35N 77 INV, but looks all civilian 
<MTW GISR2> #5 can vou flv closer for a better look 
1 , 
I 




I <MTW_GISR2> #5 need BDA on 3 sets of targets visited earlier vicinity & 34N/ 077 15W 
<UAV-5-6> roger, UAV5 going for BDA 
/<UAV-5-6> MIW-GISR, uav5 looking at previous targets vicinity 34 34N 77 15W I 
1347 <MIW-GISR~> roger, negative BDA/ I 
~ 










I <UAV-5-6> MTW-GISR, roger, standing by for BDA 
<UAV-5-6> MTW-GISR, those targets remain undamaged 







1357 <UAV-5-6> uav5 keeps eyes on target I 
I <MIW_GISR2> #5, San Jac and Deyo LASMs should be inbound 
'<UAV-3-4> standby on BDA - these recent weapons all need manual eval- lots of concurrent evals now 
I<UAV-5-6>MTW-GISR, did you copy #3 message on manual BDA process? Bottom line, standby 
, <UAV-5-6> MTW-GISR, uav5 is still standing by, you should get some BDA soon 
<UAV-5-6> MTW-GISR, uav5 reports all 3 sets of vehicles destroyed vic 34 35N 77 15W 
~ 
1430 I <MTW-GISRs> roger #5 I I I 
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17. Electronic Data Capture in FBE H 
In FBE H, improvements were made in the collection and reporting of electronic data, 
particularly for GISRC and RPM. Much however, remains to be done particularly with 
regard to LAWS and JSAF which are central to the TST process in FBEs. Table 13 
summarizes those events for which it was attempted, or would have been desirable, to 
collect data in FBE H, the success of the effort and reasons for lack of success. In 
addition to capturing the events and their associated data elements, the discussions in this 
document illustrates the problems with, and the importance of, the synchronization of the 
time stamping for all systems. 
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TABLE 13 
ELECTRONIC DATA CAPTURE IN FBE H 
____  - - _ _ -  
RPM receipt of route request - Y 
RPM transmit r o u t e q u e s t  Y __ 
Y RPM tim- calculate route - _.._ 
CST track latency - -~ p _  
I RC communications _ _ _  - - v _  
- _ _  
_ .  _ _  _- 
. -  - -~ ___ _. ____ 
D - r r d r l  
... . . . . . . .  ..... 
---I 
. -~  ______ 
IRC logs ......... to integer minutes. Need time tagtointeger seconds ........... 
. _  
-~ .......... . ~~~ 
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